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Rogue Corporations: Unlawful Corporate 
Conduct and Fiduciary Duty 
H. Justin Pace* 
ABSTRACT 
On February 28, 2018, Dick’s Sporting Goods announced that it would no 
longer sell long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.  On March 8, 2018, Dick’s 
was sued for violating the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age in public accommodations.  Dick’s 
and Walmart were also sued for violating Oregon’s ban on age discrimination.  
In addition to corporate liability under various state civil rights acts, directors 
of Dick’s and Walmart face the threat of liability for breaching their fiduciary 
duties – claims that may be much harder to defend than the more usual breach 
of fiduciary duty claim. 
Delaware corporation law has an underappreciated per se doctrine where 
the board directs the corporation to violate the law.  A knowing violation of 
positive law is bad faith, which falls under the duty of loyalty.  The business 
judgment rule will not apply and exculpation will not be available under Section 
102(b)(7).  The shareholders may not even need to show harm. 
This Article examines the relevant legal doctrine but also takes a step back 
to consider what the rule should be from an ethical and moral standpoint.  To do 
so, rather than apply traditional corporate governance arguments, this Article 
considers broader moral theories.  In addition to the utilitarian calculus that is 
so ubiquitous in corporate governance scholarship via the law and economics 
movement, this Article considers the liberalism of both John Rawls and Robert 
Nozick.  But liberalism may seem less persuasive given the rise of illiberalism 
politically on both the American Right and Left.  Given the shift away from 
liberalism, this Article also considers two non-liberal models: one a populist 
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Daniel T. Ostas, Norman Hawker, Joshua Fershee, Haskell Murray, Chad Marzen, and 
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modification of Charles Taylor’s democratic communitarianism and the other 
Catholic Social Thought. 
Unsurprisingly, the proper rule depends on which moral theory is applied.  
If that theory is liberalism (of either form covered), then a per se approach is 
troubling.  Harm to the corporation must be shown, and either the Delaware 
legislature or the corporate players, depending on the form of liberalism, must 
acquiesce to a per se rule.  Counterintuitively, it is the per se rule that runs 
against basic democratic norms.  It gives the power to litigate in response to 
harm, not to the party injured but to a third party.  Given the divergent results 
from applying different moral theories and given the democratic difficulty, the 
Delaware legislature should clarify the standard.  It will likely find that a harsh, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What do Uber’s regulatory strategy, “legal” marijuana dispensaries, 
Google’s handling of sexual harassment, and Dick’s Sporting Goods’ decision 
to stop selling long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds1 all have in 
common?  They all implicate business decisions that would be protected by 
the business judgment rule but for an embedded violation of law.  The 
treatment of corporate violations of law at the board’s direction under 
Delaware fiduciary obligation doctrine is an underappreciated topic.  Rather 
than the business judgment rule, such violations trigger a per se standard of 
liability. 
Negligence per se is “[n]egligence established as a matter of law, so that 
breach of the duty is not a jury question,” usually arising “from a statutory 
violation.”2  It is easier for a plaintiff to plead and prove a claim for negligence 
where the negligence per se doctrine applies.  An analogous per se doctrine 
for another claim would have the same effect, including for claims more 
difficult to plead and prove than negligence.3  A per se standard appears to 
apply in corporate law to breach of fiduciary duty claims where the corporate 
directors direct the corporation to violate positive law.  Normally, the business 
judgment rule largely insulates directors from liability for breach of fiduciary 
duty absent a conflict of interest.  One way to circumvent the business 
judgment rule is by alleging the directors failed to properly monitor the 
corporation under the rule laid out by the Delaware Court of Chancery in 
Caremark.4  But a Caremark claim is “possibly the most difficult theory in 
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”5  A 
per se theory for breach of fiduciary duty for violating positive law, on the 
other hand, raises the possibility of a much easier judgment to win. 
This Article will consider when a violation of law is a breach of fiduciary 
duty, whether and when it is a breach of fiduciary duty per se, and whether 
such a breach is and should be subject to exculpation in a corporate charter.  
A violation of positive law may be relevant in two contexts.  The first, and 
most straightforward, is where the board directed the corporation to violate 
the law.  The second is a failure to monitor claim under Caremark.  This 
 
 1. See infra Part IV. 
 2. Negligence per se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
 3. Per se doctrines play a prominent role in antitrust law. See South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018) (“State laws that discriminate against 
interstate commerce face ‘a virtually per se rule of invalidity.’”) (quoting Granholm 
v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005)). 
 4. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961(Del. Ch. 1996). 
 5. Id. at 967.  That may be changing with recent decisions out of Delaware. See, 
e.g., Marchland v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); In re Clovis Oncology Inc. 
Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). 
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Article will also address relief, including the appropriateness of injunctive 
relief and nominal damages where the violation of law maximizes shareholder 
wealth but is socially detrimental.  This Article will focus on Delaware law in 
the corporate context (limited liability companies raise their own distinct 
issues). 
The possibility of liability for breach of fiduciary duty per se has 
important moral and ethical implications.  This Article will consider the 
ethical implications after establishing the legal framework.  The dominance 
of law and economics in corporate and entity law makes utilitarianism the de 
facto default ethical framework for examining corporate law issues.  But as 
this Article will show, utilitarianism is unsatisfactory and too limited for the 
purposes of this scenario.  This Article will also apply and consider both the 
Rawlsian and Nozickian strains of liberalism.  And given the recent turn away 
from liberalism on both the American political Right and the American 
political Left, this Article will look at the issue through the lenses of two non-
liberal frameworks, Catholic Social Thought and a populist version of 
democratic communitarianism. 
Finally, this Article will consider various corporate lawbreaking 
scenarios in light of these frameworks.  Particular attention will be paid to 
Dick’s Sporting Goods’ and Walmart’s corporate decisions to stop selling 
firearms to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, thus violating state law prohibitions 
on age discrimination in public accommodations.  After considering and 
critiquing each moral theory in the context of examples of corporate 
lawbreaking, the Article will conclude with a recommendation for how 
fiduciary obligation law should regard “rogue” corporations.6 
 
 6. See Desimon v. Barrows, 924 A.3d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Although 
directors have wide authority to take lawful action on behalf of the corporation, they 
have no authority knowingly to cause the corporation to become a rogue, exposing the 
corporation to penalties from criminal and civil regulators.”) (emphasis added); see 
also Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith 
in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 633 (2010) (“When directors knowingly cause 
the corporation to do what it may not – engage in unlawful acts or unlawful businesses 
– they are disloyal to the corporation’s essential nature.  By causing the corporation to 
become a lawless rogue, they make the corporation untrue to itself and to the promise 
underlying its own societally authorized birth.”) (emphasis added). 
5
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II.  LEGAL DOCTRINE 
Corporations do not purely exist as a nexus of contracts.7  They are 
creatures of statute, operating under statutory grants of authority.8  Despite the 
modern, loose approach to those grants, they still operate to cabin corporate 
actions. 
Delaware law9 requires corporate directors exercise the same level of 
care as “ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar 
circumstances.”10  Despite the resemblance to the traditional negligence 
standard, directors have almost never been held liable for breaches of 
fiduciary duty under an ordinary negligence standard.11  Application of an 
ordinary negligence standard is largely foreclosed for most board actions by 
the business judgment rule.12  But if acts that violate law fall under the duty 
of loyalty rather than the duty of care, then they would not fall under the 
protection of the deferential business judgment rule.13 
First, some history regarding the division of fiduciary duties in 
Delaware: The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor led to considerable speculation that there existed a “triad” of 
 
 7. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305, 
311 (1976) (“The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which 
serves as a nexus for contracting relationships.”) (emphasis in original). 
 8. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 719 (2019) 
(citing Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good 
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 649 (2010)); cf. H. Justin Pace, 
Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Delaware Will Lead, but Will Anyone 
Follow?, 16 NEV. L.J. 1085, 1086 (2016) [hereinafter Pace, Waiver] (“The [LLC] form 
is a product of statute, but the LLC is a creature of contract.”). 
 9. This paper will focus solely on Delaware law.  But, given that many states 
look to Delaware in developing their own corporation law, this issue is likely relevant 
for many states. 
 10. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963). 
 11. See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and 
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 574–75 (2008) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Convergence] (citing Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New 
Trends in Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 
1099 (1968)); 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 167–72 (5th ed. 1998))). 
 12. See Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 568 (“Courts generally 
abstain from intervening in the affairs of corporate decisionmaking, typically by 
invoking the business judgment rule.”). 
 13. See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 93, 129 (1979) (“Bad faith may preclude the business judgment defense where 
directors knowingly violate a statute or comparable expression of public policy.”). 
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fiduciary duties under Delaware corporation law – the traditional duties of 
care and loyalty and, now, a duty of good faith.14  The Delaware Supreme 
Court made clear in Stone v. Ritter, though, that the duty of good faith was a 
component of the duty of loyalty rather than a separate, standalone fiduciary 
duty.15  The addition of the duty of good faith expanded the scope of the duty 
of loyalty.  The duty of loyalty is no longer concerned solely with self-
interested transactions; now, the duty of loyalty is omnipresent because every 
act by a fiduciary on the corporation’s behalf must have a proper corporate 
purpose.16 
Folding good faith into the duty of loyalty extends that duty to prohibit 
not just self-interested actions but also to prohibit unlawful conduct.  A 
director must “exert all reasonable efforts” to protect the interests of the 
corporation, but those efforts are narrowed: they must be lawful.17  In listing 
the ways in which a board might fail to act in good faith, the Delaware 
Supreme Court included “where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate 
applicable positive law.”18 
Directors are fiduciaries of the corporation.19  When they act within a 
proper corporate purpose, they act on behalf of the corporation.  The 
corporation has effectively delegated certain monitoring and decision-making 
authority to the directors (acting collectively as part of the board).  Thus, the 
authority of the directors extends no further than the power of the corporation 
to act.  This is retired Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Leo E. 
Strine’s logic in characterizing corporate existence as being premised on a 
“nondefeasible promise” to “conduct only lawful business through lawful 
 
 14. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (referencing 
“the triads of [directors’] fiduciary duty – good faith, loyalty or due care”). 
 15. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (citing Guttman v. Huang, 
823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
 16. Strine, supra note 6, at 636. 
 17. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 
(Del. 1988) (“[C]orporate fiduciaries . . . must exert all reasonable and lawful efforts 
to ensure that the corporation is not deprived of any advantage to which it is entitled.”) 
(emphasis added) (relying on Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). 
 18. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).  The 
other ways in which a board might fail to act in good faith are beyond the scope of 
this article. See Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 590–91 (criticizing the 
Disney definition of good faith as threatening “to expand the extent to which courts 
will review the substance of director decisions and, concomitantly, the liability 
exposure of corporate directors”). 
 19. H. Justin Pace, What Equity, the Promise Economy, and Cognition Mean for 
How Fiduciary Law Should Develop, 20 U. OF PA. J. OF BUS. L. 684, 701 (2018) 
[hereinafter Pace, Equity] (citing Marhart, Inc. v. Calmat Co., Civ. A. No. 11,820, 
1992 WL 82365 at *336 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992) (reported in 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 330 
(1992)) (“Delaware directors are fiduciaries.”). 
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activities.”20  The Delaware General Corporation Law is permissive, but it 
limits corporations to “any lawful business or purpose.”21  A parallel can be 
drawn with the requirement that contracts be formed for a lawful purpose to 
be enforceable. 
Defining a violation of law as bad faith would further seem to foreclose 
a safe harbor for interested transactions.  Under the Delaware statute, a 
transaction is not voidable on the basis that it is interested if it is affirmed by 
a majority of disinterested directors or by a majority of disinterested 
shareholders.22  But the statute qualifies this by providing that the approval 
must be in good faith.23  Strine suggests that the good faith qualification means 
interested transactions that violate the law cannot be cleansed and thus are 
always voidable.24  There is some logic to this in that violations of law fit 
poorly with the directors’ duties to act in the best interest of the corporation.  
But it stretches logic to assume that the Delaware legislature intended to treat 
violations of law more harshly than the conflicted transactions that sit at the 
heart of the duty of loyalty doctrine. 
A.  Section 102(b)(7) 
Delaware’s division of the fiduciary duties owed by directors to the 
corporation between the duties of loyalty and care is a distinction with a 
difference.  Violations of the duty of care may be exculpated in the corporate 
charter under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 102(b)(7).  Section 
102(b)(7) endorses inclusion in a Delaware certificate of incorporation of a 
“provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty as a director.”25  But it also sets limits on that power to exculpate directors 
from liability for breach of their fiduciary duties.  The certificate of 
incorporation may not limit liability for “breach of the director’s duty of 
loyalty.”26  Importantly for the purposes of this Article, Section 102(b)(7) also 
 
 20. Strine, supra note 6, at 651. 
 21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2016).  Section 144 only refers to disinterested 
directors, making no such qualification for a shareholder vote.  Fliegler v. Lawrence 
nonetheless read such a qualification into the statute. 361 A.2d 218 (1976). 
 23. § 144. 
 24. Strine, supra note 6, at 657. 
 25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2016). 
 26. § 102(b)(7)(i).   
8
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prohibits limits on liability for “acts or omissions not in good faith or which 
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law.”27 
The Delaware Court of Chancery has clarified the applicability of 
Section 102(b)(7) by stating plainly that a violation of positive law violates 
duty of good faith, itself a subset of the duty of loyalty.28  The Delaware 
Supreme Court reiterated this in Stone v. Ritter.29  Thus, violations of positive 
law would seem to not be exculpable.  But Section 102(b)(7) also includes an 
express carve out for a knowing failure to comply with the law.30  Placing 
violations of law within the ambit of the duty of loyalty would then both create 
a redundancy in Section 102(b)(7)31 and prevent exculpation for both knowing 
and unknowing violations of the law, the former explicitly and the latter 
implicitly.32  Corporations would also be barred from indemnifying directors 
under these circumstances.33 
 
 27. § 102(b)(7)(ii).  At least one member of the drafting committee thought the 
good faith language, at least, was surplusage because he viewed a violation of good 
faith as a violation of the duty of loyalty. Penn. Law, 102(b)(7) 22:08–24:05, 
YOUTUBE (June 6, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wFxA2T-gEOU 
[perma.cc/M3RY-S673].  
 28. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. Ct. 2003) (“[O]ne 
cannot act loyally as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the 
positive laws it is obliged to obey.”); Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced 
Mobilecomm Techs., 854 A.2d 121 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Under Delaware law, a 
fiduciary may not choose to manage an entity in an illegal fashion, even if the fiduciary 
believes that the illegal activity will result in profits for the entity.”); In re Massey 
Energy Co., C.A., No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (May 31, 2011) (“[A] 
fiduciary of a Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by 
knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.”). 
 29. 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 30. § 102(b)(7)(ii). 
 31. But see Strine, supra note 6, at 660 (referencing “the reality that redundancy 
is actually a pervasive presence in statutes and contracts, operating as a belt-and-
suspenders protection against unintended consequences”). 
 32. But see id. at 652 n.69 (interpreting the “knowing” language as allowing 
exculpation of unwitting violations); Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 589–
90 (arguing that Section 102(b)(7) is “an internally contradictory botch job” that 
should not be relied on to define good faith) (quoting Christopher M. Bruner, Good 
Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in Corporate 
Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1155 (2006)). 
 33.  Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. Co., 54 A.3d 1093, 1111 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Sections 
145(a) and (b) of the DGCL permit a corporation to indemnify [a corporate officer or 
director] so long as ‘the person acted in good faith and in a manner the person 
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, 
and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to 
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B.  Open Questions 
A knowing violation of law at the direction of the corporate board of 
directors would seem straightforward, regardless of the issues raised above.  
But while corporations frequently violate the law, it is rarer that they violate 
the law at the direct instruction of the board.34  That specific scenario is the 
focus of the ethical analysis in Part V, but there remain interesting, unresolved 
legal questions.  One example is when a failure by the board to monitor the 
agents of the corporation in such a way as to prevent violations of positive law 
breaches their fiduciary duties under Caremark.  Failure to monitor falls under 
the umbrella of good faith, and thus the duty of loyalty.35  Strine suggests that 
a violation of positive law by the officers – or even just employees – of the 
corporation could form the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors 
for failure to monitor.36  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
applying Delaware precedent, held in In re Abbot Laboratories that directors 
would be acting in bad faith if “the directors knew of the violations of law, 
took no steps in an effort to prevent or remedy the situation, and that failure 
to take any action for such an inordinate amount of time resulted in substantial 
corporate losses.”37  The court characterized board behavior in that 
circumstance as intentional.38  If this approach were adopted by the Delaware 
courts, absent steps to prevent or remedy the situation, any violation of law 
that the board knew about would fall under the per se rule, not the more usual, 
exacting Caremark standard. 
A Caremark claim is “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation 
law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”39  But what is 
 
 34. Cf. Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty 
of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1494 (1984) (noting that most 
board time is devoted to “a continuing flow of supervisory process” not “affirmative 
action on individual matters”). 
 35. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 695 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (indicating that a board must “exercise a good faith judgment that the 
corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to 
assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely 
manner as a matter of ordinary operations” to meet its duty). 
 36. Strine, supra note 6, at 686. 
 37. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 
2003).  Although the court was technically applying Illinois law, the court examined 
Delaware precedence because “Illinois case law follows Delaware law in establishing 
demand futility requirements.” Id. at 803. 
 38. Id. at 809. 
 39. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.  The plaintiff will face a somewhat less difficult 
task even where it can show the “board failed to oversee the company’s obligation to 
comply with positive law” rather than simply mitigate business risk. In re Facebook, 
10
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effectively a per se theory of fiduciary duty raises the possibility of a much 
easier judgment to win.  This stands in stark contrast with application of the 
business judgment rule to duty of care claims, which has been compared to a 
per se theory running in the other direction.40  Breach of fiduciary duty claims 
under Delaware law in the corporate context could thus be arranged on a 
continuum from the lightest to the heaviest burden for the plaintiff: violations 
of law under the per se standard < interested transactions < Caremark failure 
to monitor < normal business judgment.41   
Also relevant is whether a failure to disclose a violation of positive law 
is a breach of fiduciary duty.42  For both failure to monitor and failure to 
disclose claims, it would seem that liability is not per se.  Directors are not 
strictly liable for the unlawful actions of every corporate agent.43  Nor must 
the board disclose every violation of law by corporate agents acting on behalf 
of the corporation.44  The directors need not, for example, disclose every 
traffic ticket received by employees driving on company business.45 
Another question is what exactly qualifies as “positive law” for these 
purposes.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines positive law as statutory or 
regulatory law, as opposed to case law or moral law.46  Strine has 
characterized the duty to comply with the law as “an obligation to be faithful 
to the laws of the chartering society in exercising corporate powers.”47  
Elsewhere, he has characterized it as loyalty “to the corporation’s basic 
charter, a charter that precludes the corporation from pursuing profits by 
 
Inc. Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661, 2019 WL 2320842, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 30, 
2019). 
 40. Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware 
Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 977 (1994) (Prior to the mid-eighties 
“the business judgment rule had been applied in such a manner as to constitute an 
almost per se bar to shareholder claims of directors’ breach of their fiduciary duty of 
care.”) (citing Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial 
Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. 
L. REV. 591, 594 (1983)). 
 41. A Caremark claim may be “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation 
law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment,” In re Caremark Int’l. 
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967.  Also relevant is whether a failure to disclose a 
violation of positive law is a breach of fiduciary duty. Id.  It seems clear that liability 
is not per se. Id.  The directors need not, for example, disclose every traffic ticket 
received by employees driving on company business. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilcomm Techs. Inc., 
854 A.2d 121, 143 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 43. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.   
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Positive Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 47. Strine, supra note 6, at 649 (emphasis added). 
11
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illegal means.”48  Corporations are creatures of statute that exist by corporate 
charter,49 but it is specifically a state corporate charter issued by a single state.  
This could conceivably only obligate a director of a Delaware corporation to 
follow Delaware law.  The director would be free to direct the corporation to 
violate New York law or California law or federal law.  This seems at odds 
with the language elsewhere, which neither expressly nor implicitly includes 
such a limitation.  What about foreign law?  Is it a breach of fiduciary duty if 
the board of Alphabet Inc. directs employees to “cheat” on the censored 
version of its Google search engine that the Chinese government requires?50  
Is a breach of fiduciary duty suit really the best place to litigate Airbnb’s 
decision to delist rentals in Israel’s settlements in the West Bank?51  Strine’s 
view would suggest that it is, and no limiting principle has as of yet developed 
in the caselaw. 
Chief Justice Strine has been dismissive of concerns about expanding 
fiduciary obligation to cover violations of law, suggesting that it is of no 
concern because in many cases no injury is caused and thus damages will not 
be available.52  But injury may, of course, exist.53  More to the point, Delaware 
courts have still awarded attorneys’ fees where a breach of fiduciary duty does 
not result in measurable damages.54  The Delaware Court of Chancery has 
 
 48. Id. at 652. 
 49. Pollman, supra note 8, at 719 (citing Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core 
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 649 
(2010)). 
 50. See Ryan Gallagher, Google Plans to Launch Censored Search Engine in 
China, Leaked Documents Reveal, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 1, 2018, 4:58 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/google-china-search-engine-censorship/ 
[perma.cc/5FFS-RFVR] (“Google is planning to launch a censored version of its 
search engine in China that will blacklist websites and search terms about human 
rights, democracy, religion, and peaceful protest . . . .  The custom Android [search] 
app . . . has already been demonstrated to the Chinese government.”). 
 51. The decision by Airbnb prompted a suit in response for discrimination under 
Israeli law. Israeli Settler Sues Airbnb for Dropping West Bank Listings, JEWISH 
TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Nov. 23, 2018, 6:42 AM), https://www.jta.org/2018/11/23/is 
rael/israeli-settler-sues-airbnb-dropping-west-bank-listings [perma.cc/5HZT-U5Z8]. 
 52. Strine, supra note 6, at 652 n.69. 
 53. An Oregon man sought $10,000 in compensatory and $1,000,000 in punitive 
damages from Walmart for alleged violations of his civil rights under state law. Nick 
Morgan, Man Denied Sale of Rifle by Dick’s and Walmart Seeks $1M, THE BULLETIN 
(Aug. 11, 2018 11:12 AM), https://www.bendbulletin.com/nation/6443458-151/man-
denied-sale-of-rifle-by-dicks-and [perma.cc/XV4N-TT84]; see also infra Part IV.4. 
 54. See, e.g., William Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 759 (Del. 2011) 
(granting attorneys’ fee even though the plaintiffs “were left without a typical damage 
award because the Court’s appraisal of the property came in at a value lower than the 
sale price” because otherwise the plaintiffs “would have been penalized for bringing 
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refused to award damages where the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of 
proof,55 but “the internal logic of Delaware law demands that the burden shift 
to the defendant” after the plaintiff has proven breach.56  And harkening back 
to the equitable roots of fiduciary obligation,57 Delaware courts may loosen 
“normally stringent requirements of causation and damages when a breach of 
the duty of loyalty is shown” due to “concerns of equity and deterrence.”58  
The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that damages from a breach of 
fiduciary duty should be calculated liberally.59  Certainty is not required.60  
Nor is uncertainty to the defendant’s benefit – those uncertainties will be 
resolved against the party that breached their duties.61  Even the availability 
of only nominal damages could drive settlement for non-nominal amounts 
where a claim has a very high likelihood of surviving motions to dismiss and 
for summary judgment.  And the Delaware Court of Chancery has broad 
powers to fashion equitable remedies.62 
Finally, tying corporate liability to violations of non-corporate law has 
the potential to create political risk.63  That political risk can lead to increased 
 
a successful claim against the [defendants] for breach of their fiduciary duty of 
loyalty.”). 
 55. In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 
5018535, at *56 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2018). 
 56. Holger Spamann, PLX, Burden of Proof for Damages, and the Internal Logic 
of Delaware Law, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. AND FIN. REG. (Nov. 30, 
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/30/plx-burden-of-proof-for-
damages-and-the-internal-logic-of-delaware-law/ [perma.cc/YN8F-4399]. 
 57. See Pace, Equity, supra note 19, at 687–91 (detailing the equitable roots of 
fiduciary law). 
 58. CertiSign Holding, Inc. v. Kulikovsky, C.A. No. 12055-JRS, slip op. at 77 
(Del. Ch. June 7, 2018) (citing In re Primedia Inc. Deriv. Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 262 
(Del. Ch. 2006)). 
 59. Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 1996). 
 60. Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Investors, LLC, C.A. 
No. 11802-VCL, slip op. at 123 (Del. Ch., July 6, 2018). 
 61. Id. at 124 (“[U]certainties in awarding damages are generally resolved 
against the wrongdoer.”). 
 62. See, e.g., In re Oxbow Carbon LLC Unitholder Litig., C.A. no. 12447-VCL, 
slip op. at 4–27 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2018) (discussing the court’s equitable powers at 
length). 
 63. For example, an SEC commissioner “berated Citigroup Inc. executives in a 
private meeting over the bank’s decision to curtail some of the business it does with 
companies that sell guns.” Robert Schmidt, Senators Seek Probe of SEC Member Who 
Assailed Citi’s Gun Stance, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-13/senators-seek-probe-of-sec-
member-who-assailed-citi-s-gun-stance [perma.cc/9UTP-RHZS].  Of course, the 
implications of changes to policies related to the sale of firearms go beyond potential 
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damages.  The Governor of Florida has responded to Airbnb delisting rentals 
in Israel’s settlements in the West Bank by ordering that the state stop 
reimbursements to state employees for stays through Airbnb while on official 
state business.64  Airbnb’s decision in other circumstances would be protected 
by the business judgment rule, but because it may violate Florida65 and 
Israeli66 law, Airbnb may now be liable for damages not just from a settlement 
or verdict in any lawsuit but from other consequences such as the loss of 
revenues from employees of the third-largest state in the United States 
traveling on official business.67  This would be true even if Airbnb’s actions 
do not violate Florida law.68  Implications of the applicable rule, though, are 
as much ethical as they are legal. 
III.  ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
A per se rule for violations of positive law implicates broader principles.  
It implicates, for example, the tension between fiduciary obligation’s 
equitable roots and its modern statutory and contractual form.69  But it also 
implicates broader democratic norms. 
The existing scholarship on fiduciary liability for corporate violations of 
law takes a narrower approach.70  Rather than examine this issue directly 
through the lens of more common approaches in the corporate governance 
scholarship, this Article will instead examine it through political theory 
models.  There is utility in stepping back and looking at a problem through a 
new lens: it allows us to judge those models against first principles.  To the 
extent that Americans have in significant numbers rejected the old liberal 
order, it is fruitful to consider ethical frameworks other than those that provide 
the philosophical foundation for the free-market conservatism of the modern 
 
liability for aiding and abetting violations of prohibitions of age discrimination in 
public accommodations under state law. See infra Part IV.4. 
 64. Letter from Governor Ron DeSantis to David Clark (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DMS-Letter.pdf 
[perma.cc/FB2A-LZJU]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  
 67. Letter from Governor Ron DeSantis to David Clark, supra note 64. 
 68. Id.  
 69. See generally, Pace, Equity, supra note 19 (discussing the tension both in the 
historical development of fiduciary obligation law and in the scholarly literature). 
 70. See, e.g., Strine, supra note 6; Pollman, supra note 8; Bainbridge, 
Convergence, supra note 11; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in 
Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate 
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). 
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American Right71 and the egalitarian liberalism of the modern American 
Left.72  Conversely, applying theoretical models to concrete issues helps test 
the usefulness and correctness of those models.73 
Why five models rather than just one, superior model?  For a rule to be 
just, it must meet some standard of substantive correctness.74  If multiple 
separate models of political theory each have significant flaws, then using 
only one model is more likely to lead to rules that are substantively incorrect.  
As this Article will show, each of the five models discussed below have fatal 
flaws.  And if multiple separate political theory models tend to reach the same 
results, then they provide an analytic check on each other.  Because political 
theory models can include errors and can be misapplied, the likelihood of a 
conclusion being optimal is higher where more than one theory supports it.75  
But where the application of multiple theories leads to different results, we 
must reconsider any single conclusion and give serious consideration to how 
to resolve the split.76  I will return to the issue of how to resolve that split after 
demonstrating that applying the five below models to the issue at hand leads 
to divergent conclusions.77 
 
 71. See Thomas Nagel, Foreword to ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND 
UTOPIA xvi (1974) (pointing toward Anarchy, State, and Utopia as providing the 
“libertarian element . . . of the ideology of modern conservatism” and “free-market 
conservatism” with “a philosophical foundation”). 
 72. See id. (pointing toward John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin as providing 
“egalitarian liberalism” with a philosophical foundation). 
 73. Cf. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 11 
(Dover 2006) (“I cannot stand forward, and give praise or blame to anything which 
relates to human actions and human concerns, on a simple view of the object as it 
stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical 
abstraction.”). 
 74. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought, 33 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 153, 153 (1990) (“By ‘justice,’ I mean the correctness of the end or results 
of a legal system . . . .  Put another way, justice is the substantive correctness of a legal 
decision.”). 
 75. Cf. id. at 154–55 (“The greater the number of different sound methods of 
evaluation that converge on a single conclusion, the more confident we can be in that 
conclusion.”). 
 76. Cf. id. at 155 (“Conversely, a conflict between competing sound modes of 
analysis over a particular conclusion should lessen our confidence in it and motivate 
us to search for a better approach.”). 
 77. See infra Part V. 
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A.  Utilitarianism 
The orthodox approach, in implication if not expression, in business law 
scholarship over the last several decades has been utilitarianism.78  
Utilitarianism is rooted in the work of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.79  
Under this view, the best rule maximizes happiness by producing “the greatest 
possible surplus of pleasure over pain.”80  An action is “right” if it tends to 
promote happiness and more right the more it promotes happiness; an action 
is “wrong” if it “tends to produce the reverse of happiness” and more wrong 
the more it does so.81  Corporate governance literature essentially defines 
happiness as maximizing overall economic value.82  With caveats, this 
approach has much to commend it.  The problem is not so much that the 
economics are off as that some of the underlying assumptions are 
unsupportable. 
Utilitarianism would seem to accept any action that resulted in greater 
overall economic value.  Under utilitarianism, then, efficient breach is not 
unjust.  This is uncontroversial, at least within the scholarship and the law.  
Parties are free to breach a contract so long as they pay damages.  
Utilitarianism does not strictly require the latter;83 justice does.  In the context 
of positive law, utilitarianism would seem to justify violating the law so long 
as the benefit – whether to the actor or more broadly – exceeded the harm.  
 
 78. See Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political 
Theory, 85 WASH. L. REV. 753, 786–87 n.142 (2007) (“Bentham is recognized in some 
circles as ‘the parent of economic analysis of law.’”) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, 
Animal Welfare and Economic Analysis, THE FACULTY BLOG (April 18, 2006), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/04/animal_welfare_.html 
[perma.cc/VLQ7-UMZ8]); see also Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring 
Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1387 (2008) (referring to 
utilitarianism as “corporate law’s implicit moral theory”) 
 79. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1789); see also Ronald 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK 
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1996). 
 80. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 413 (1874). 
 81. MILL, supra note 79, at 10. 
 82. See Coase, supra note 79; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 79. 
 83. Cf. Matt Zwolinski, The Separateness of Persons and Liberal Theory, 42 THE 
J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 147, 149 (2008) (“For a utilitarian, there is no essential 
difference between one person’s utility and another’s.”). 
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This view justifies theft so long as the first party valued the object of the theft 
more highly than the second party valued it.84 
The answer to that problem is that utilitarian calculus should not focus 
on individual acts (act-utilitarianism).  Rather, the focus should be on the 
utility of rules (rule-utilitarianism).85  The rule-utilitarian examines the benefit 
to a society of a given rule at the aggregate level, and instead of examining 
the utility of each act violating the rule, condemns all violations of a rule 
deemed beneficial.86  But arguably, this distinction is both artificial and not in 
line with the traditional conception of utilitarianism.87  And an ethical 
framework that does not tell us when we can break rules is of limited value.  
Two rules might be beneficial to society: “directors should act to maximize 
the economic return to the corporation’s shareholders” and “directors should 
ensure that the corporation operates in compliance with the law.”  A useful 
ethical framework should give us a way to resolve contradictions between the 
two.  And while rule-utilitarianism avoids stamping its approval on some 
pernicious behavior, such as the theft mentioned above, it does not save us 
 
 84. “Question.  What if I see something that I wanna take and it belongs to 
someone else?” 
“Then you will be arrested.” 
“But what if I want it more than the person who has it?” 
“Still illegal.” 
“That doesn’t follow.  No, I want it more.” 
GUARDIANS OF THE GALAXY (Marvel Studios 2014).  Scholars have even gone so far 
as to argue that utilitarian and other consequentialist models could lead to justifying 
rape, murder, and genocide. Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and 
Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis of the Law, 96 
CAL. L.R. 323, 333 (2008) (citing Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in 
J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM – FOR AND AGAINST 105 
(1973); David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 
356–62 (2002); John C. Harsanyi, Problems with Act-Utilitarianism and Malevolent 
Preferences, in HARE AND CRITICS 89, 96 (Douglas Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988)). 
 85. KAREN LEBACQZ, SIX THEORIES OF JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES FROM 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 23 (Augsburg Publishing House 1986).  
See also Bruner, supra note 78, at 1428 (defining act- and rule- utilitarianism).  
According to Redish and Berlow, there is “a seemingly limitless variety of nuanced 
approaches to [utilitarian] theory.” Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 771. 
 86. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 771. 
 87. Id. (“Bentham and Mill made no distinctions at all between ‘act-’ and ‘rule-’ 
utilitarianism.”); see also Bruner, supra note 78, at 1429 (“Philosopher David Lyons 
has argued that act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism, upon close inspection, are 
‘extensionally equivalent.’” (relying on DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF 
UTILITARIANISM 62–197 (1965))). 
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from the possibility of a need “that we all be sacrificed in the monster’s maw, 
in order to increase total utility.”88 
Utilitarianism presents another serious problem: it is frequently too hard 
to calculate the change in utility that will result from a given rule change, or 
even calculate with any accuracy the likelihood of a given change in utility.  
This invariably leads to justifying a policy change that fits one’s priors by 
claiming that it will increase utility.  But because the change in utility is not 
easily susceptible to accurate calculation, this means moving away from 
rigorous analysis of policy choices, not toward the sort of rigorous analysis 
we find desirable.  All theories will necessarily consider some form of 
utilitarian calculus when an accurate calculation is available and rights have 
been determined and incorporated.  The advantage of other theories is that 
they provide rules that are useful when an accurate calculation is not available. 
Utilitarianism, though, must be considered first because it looms large 
over every other ethical model.  For all its weaknesses, utilitarianism is 
persuasive enough at least that every other model must take into account 
changes to overall utility. 
B.  Liberalism 
Fiduciary obligation has long been viewed through a moral lens rather 
than an economic lens.89  Or to put it another way, relying on Kant’s liberalism 
rather than utilitarianism,90 people must be treated as ends, not merely as 
means to an end.91  Central to liberalism is the individual and the rights of the 
 
 88. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 41 (“Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the 
possibility of utility monsters who get enormously greater gains in utility from any 
sacrifice of others than these others lose.  For, unacceptably, the theory seems to 
require that we all be sacrificed in the monster’s maw, in order to increase total 
utility.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Pace, Equity, supra note 19, at 701–06 (summarizing and critiquing 
“traditionalist” views of fiduciary obligation). 
 90. The line between utilitarianism and liberalism is fuzzy.  John Stuart Mill’s 
“more instrumental justification of liberalism” straddles the line. Redish & Berlow, 
supra note 78, at 764 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 63 (1859)).  But 
utilitarianism’s basic framing of individuals as means rather than ends separates it 
from liberalism. See Zwolinski, supra note 83, at 152 (discussing Kantian critiques of 
utilitarianism by Nozick and Rawls on this basis). 
 91. Stakeholder theory has a Kantian foundation. See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman 
& John McVea, A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management, in BLACKWELL 
HANDBOOK OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 17 (M. Hitt, E. Freeman & J. Harrison, eds. 
2001) (describing the justification for the stakeholder theory as rooted in Kantian 
principles because it argued that “managers should make corporate decisions 
respecting shareholders’ well-being rather than treating them as means to a corporate 
end”) (emphasis in original).  Catholic Social Thought also takes the position that 
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individual.  Most definitions of liberalism “recognize the centrality of some 
form of individual autonomy.”92  Per Northwestern Law Professor Martin 
Redish, “autonomy dictates a significant level of free choice for the individual 
on issues of some consequence to him, unfettered by coercive external forces, 
either governmental or private.”93  Liberalism is arguably the most important 
philosophical foundation for U.S. law.  Let us, then, consider two important 
strains of liberalism: John Rawls’ Theory of Justice94 and Robert Nozick’s 
Entitlement Theory.95 
1.  John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 
Rawls and Nozick have very different visions of what liberalism 
requires.  While Nozick sees liberalism as requiring substantive autonomy be 
protected, Rawls rejects utilitarianism,96 but otherwise takes a looser view.97  
Redish has characterized Rawls as focusing on protecting not substantive 
autonomy but instead process-based autonomy; that is, “the ability of 
individuals to control the nature of their participation in the processes of 
collective democratic government.”98  Public positions and offices, for 
example, must be open to all under Rawls’ view.  Substantive autonomy, on 
the other hand, “refers to the more general power of individuals to make 
decisions directing the course of their lives.”99  Substantive autonomy 
includes a right to actions that negatively affect the interests of others so long 
as their rights are not infringed.100  To Nozick, on the other hand, procedural 
protections are necessary but not sufficient.101 
 
people, especially workers, must be treated as an ends, not as a means. See, e.g., 
Laborem Exercens ¶ 7 (1981). 
 92. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 764. 
 93. Id. 
 94. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press revised ed. 1999).  
According to Nozick himself, “[p]olitical philosophers must either work within 
Rawls’ theory or explain why not.” NOZICK, supra note 71, at 183. 
 95. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 183. 
 96. See RAWLS, supra note 94, at 3 (“Justice . . . does not allow that the sacrifices 
imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.”). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 765. 
 99. Id. at 765. 
 100. Id. (“[S]ubstantive liberty . . . may extend . . . to also include individual 
decisions that simultaneously impact the interests of other members of society, such 
as whether to sell automatic weapons.”). 
 101. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 31 (“There is no side constraint on how we may 
use a tool . . . .  There are procedures to be followed . . . .  But there is no limit on what 
we may do to it to best achieve our goals.”). 
19
Pace: Rogue Corporations
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
20 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
 
 
Rawls structured his Theory of Justice around “justice as fairness.”102  
Rawls argued that we can only rationally choose how to structure a just society 
from the “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance.”103  Parties choosing 
principles from behind the veil of ignorance “do not know what position they 
hold in society.”104  An individual in such a situation has an incentive to 
arrange society in the fairest manner possible.  Rawls derived from this his 
“First Principle, which requires that individuals be given as much liberty as 
possible so long as each member of society enjoys the same degree of 
liberty.”105  Rawls’ Second Principle requires that inequalities resulting from 
state intervention “be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members 
of society; and they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all, 
under conditions of equality of opportunity.”106  Inequalities tie in with the 
“problem of distributive social justice,” which concerns how the benefits of 
societal cooperation should be distributed and allocated.107  Rawls did not take 
an absolutist view of inequality; rather, he argued that both social inequality 
and economic inequality could be just, but only if those inequalities “result in 
compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged 
members of society.”108 
Rawls’ version of liberalism has two basic and insurmountable 
problems: transaction costs and aggregate wealth.  Rawls did not take into 
account transaction costs.  Even if we might, behind the veil of ignorance, 
choose to arrange our affairs in a different manner, we may rationally choose 
not to rearrange our affairs in that manner in reality.  Not because of 
oppression or self-interest, but because both the costs of change and the 
inevitable risk associated with it – the transaction costs – would be too high.109  
And as Nozick explains, any patterned principle of distribution requires 
 
 102. See LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 33 (rooting “justice as fairness” in “the social 
contract theories of Locke and Rosseau, and the deontology of Kant”). 
 103. Id. at 34; Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 766. 
 104. See LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 34. 
 105. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 766. (internal citations omitted). 
 106. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 107. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 184. 
 108. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 13 (emphasis added). 
 109. Cf. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE 184 (Penguin 
Books 2011) (“According to Burke, no mortal is smart enough to design a society 
from first principles.  A society is an organic system that develops spontaneously, 
governed by myriad interactions and adjustments that no human mind can pretend to 
understand.  Just because we cannot capture its workings in verbal propositions does 
not mean it should be scrapped and reinvented according to the fashionable theories 
of the day.  Such ham-fisted tinkering will only lead to unintended consequences, 
culminating in violent chaos.”). 
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repeated violations of individual property rights because it is not self-
perpetuating.110 
The other fatal flaw to Rawlsian liberalism is that it focuses on an 
arrangement to the benefit of the “least of these” to the exclusion of 
considerations of absolute wealth.  Transactions that create value and thus 
increase absolute wealth are enormously beneficial.  Such transactions have 
lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the last several 
decades.111  To be sure, Rawls did “argue that inequalities are justified if they 
serve to raise the position of the worst-off group in the society, if without the 
inequalities the worst-off group would be even more worse off.”112  But a 
transaction that benefits the wealthy but does not benefit nor hurt the poor is, 
all else equal, beneficial to society.113  The focus on “the least of these” also 
does not give useful guidance on any number of issues, including this one.114 
Rawls paid limited attention to when violations of law are justified.  
Under Rawls’ view, an unjust law must be changed,115 not necessarily 
disobeyed.  We are to comply with just laws,116 although that does not answer 
the question of the appropriate liability standard for corporate directors.  For 
unjust laws, Rawls not only departed from the view that we have an obligation 
to disobey them, but also argued we, at least sometimes, have an obligation to 
obey them.117  This may be a matter of semantics, though, as this obligation 
 
 110. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 167–74. 
 111. See, e.g., ANGUS DEATON, THE GREAT ESCAPE: HEALTH, WEALTH, AND THE 
ORIGINS OF INEQUALITY 160 (Princeton University Press 2013) (“[T]he rapid growth 
of average incomes, particularly in China and India, and particularly after 1975, did 
much to reduce extreme poverty in the world.  In China most of all, but also in India, 
the escape of hundreds of millions from traditional and long-established poverty 
qualifies as the greatest escape of all.”); see also Caritas in veritate ¶ 21 (2009) 
(“[G]rowth . . . continues to be a positive factor that has lifted billions of people out 
of misery.”). 
 112. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 188; but see RAWLS, supra note 94, at 13 (“Offhand 
it hardly seems like that person who view themselves as equals, entitled to press their 
claims upon one another, would agree to a principle which may require lesser life 
prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by 
others.”).  Rawls’ discussion of efficiency seems to suggest that he doesn’t necessarily 
see such transactions as beneficial. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 60; but see id. at 72 
(indicating that, once welfare has been maximized for the worst-off representative, the 
next step is to maximize welfare for the second worst-off representative man). 
 113. See NOZICK, supra note 71, at 188. 
 114. See id.  
 115. Id. at 3. 
 116. Id. at 308. 
 117. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 308 (“Now it is sometimes said that we are never 
required to comply in these cases.  But this is a mistake.  The injustice of a law is not, 
in general, a sufficient reason for not adhering to it.”). 
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does not hold for laws that “exceed certain limits of injustice.”118  Rawls 
viewed compliance with unjust laws as necessary for a functioning society.119  
He even went so far as to argue that civil disobedience might not be justified 
in a society that oppresses many minority groups because it could create 
“serious disorder,” which might lead “to a breakdown in the respect for law 
and the constitution, thereby setting in motion consequences unfortunate for 
all.”120  Where disobedience to the law is justified, though, courts should take 
that into account in reducing or suspending punishment.121 
Redish associates Rawls and Nozick with process-based and substantive 
autonomy, respectively,122 and he concludes that, per either Rawls or Nozick, 
liberal democracy “requires that individuals be autonomous when 
participating in governmental processes and seeking to influence the decisions 
of democratic institutions.”123  In analyzing corporate law, this Article will 
view Rawlsian liberalism through the lens of Redish’s focus on the 
importance of process-based autonomy and democratic norms, a focus that is 
particularly useful for examining the appropriateness of a per se rule.  Now, 
though, we turn to the scholar whom Redish contrasts with Rawls – Robert 
Nozick. 
2.  Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory 
Nozick’s version of liberalism more readily fits into John Stuart Mill’s 
harm principle: power can only be exercised over a person “to prevent harm 
for others,” not for “[h]is own good, either physical or moral.”124  Mill’s harm 
principle, of course, raises a question of its own: How do we determine harm 
to others?  Is this a question for the courts or for the legislature? 
Under Nozick’s Entitlement Theory, people are entitled to holdings that 
they obtain in accordance with the principles of justice in acquisition and 
 
 118. Id.; see also id. at 309 (“[I]t is evident that our duty or obligation to accept 
existing arrangements may sometimes be overridden. . . .  Unjust laws do not all stand 
on a par.”); Id. at 310 (“[O]nly a few [writers] think that any deviation from justice, 
however small, nullifies the duty to comply with existing rules.”); Id. at 314 (“A law 
or policy is sufficiently just, or at least not unjust, if when we try to imagine how the 
ideal procedure would work out, we conclude that most persons taking part in this 
procedure and carrying out its stipulations would favor the law or policy.”).  
 119. See id. at 312 (“Without some recognition of this duty mutual trust and 
confidence are liable to break down.”). 
 120. Id. at 328. 
 121. Id. at 339. 
 122. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 767 (noting that “Nozick and Rawls failed 
explicitly to recognize the process-based/substantive dichotomy”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. MILL, supra note 90, at 91. 
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justice in transfer.125  That is, people have a right to property obtained in a just 
fashion, and they have the right to dispense that property.126  Because people 
only have a right to what they acquire justly, provisions must also be made for 
remedying holdings acquired unjustly.127 
Nozick relied heavily on “the Kantian principle that individuals are ends 
and not merely means.”128  This means that individuals “may not be sacrificed 
or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent.  Individuals are 
inviolable.”129  Individual rights may be violated only if “prior consent is 
impossible or very costly to negotiate,” but full compensation must be paid 
regardless.130  Under this Principle of Compensation, compensation must be 
paid both for the “border crossings” just mentioned and for a ban on action 
that infringes on individual liberty by robbing individuals of the “freedom to 
act.”131  This leads to protections for what Redish terms “substantive 
autonomy”: “the more general power of individuals to make decisions 
directing the course of their lives.”132  This is hardly a radical view in theory, 
but it is extraordinarily strict in application. 
Nozick’s view focuses on the individual, and in doing so, he rejects the 
notion of a social good divorced from individuals.133  Social entities do not 
have interests that demand consideration; only individuals do.134  Nozick was 
concerned that talk of the social good would provide cover for the use of 
individuals as means rather than ends.135  This led Nozick to the conclusion 
that only what he termed the minimal state – a very minimal state – can be 
morally justified because “[a]ny state more extensive violates people’s 
rights.”136 
Only the minimal state can be justified because the rights of an 
association are limited to “the sum of the individual rights that its members or 
clients transfer to the association.”137  This would logically extend to 
corporations.  Shareholders cannot give the corporation any rights they do not 
 
 125. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 151. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 152–53. 
 128. Id. at 30–31. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 72. 
 131. LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 53. 
 132. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 765. 
 133. See generally NOZICK, supra note 71. 
 134. Id. at 32–33 (“[T]here is no social entity with a good that undergoes some 
sacrifice for its own good.  There are only individual people, different individual 
people, with their own individual lives.”). 
 135. Id. at 34. 
 136. Id. at 149. 
 137. Id. at 89. 
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possess,138 and the state cannot give the corporation any additional rights 
because it, too, has no more rights or powers than the individuals associated 
with it.  Proponents of concession theory argue that the corporation is 
fundamentally a state creation, and thus “the state has the right to regulate its 
creation as it sees fit.”139  Nozick would reject this view to the extent that it 
would give the state power to regulate the corporation beyond the (very 
limited) power it has to regulate individuals. 
But Nozick’s Entitlement Theory has its own problems.  Nozick’s 
absolutist view regarding the infringement of individual rights makes the 
entire modern corporate economy, built on limited liability, suspect.  Limited 
liability is, after all, an artificial, state-imposed limit on redress for 
infringement of individual rights.  Nozick recognized just that: he argued that 
a corporation should be free to contract for limited liability, but that its tort 
liability must be unlimited.140  But this dragoons in persons who are not 
tortfeasors merely because they have an interest in an association.  To the 
extent the corporation is a tortfeasor, it makes perfect sense that the entirety 
of its assets be at stake.  To the extent an individual is a tortfeasor, it makes 
perfect sense that the entirety of the individual’s assets be at stake.  And that 
is just the case under modern limited liability.  An individual is always 
responsible – and liable – for their own acts.  It does not follow that buying a 
share of the residual income of the corporation should open the buyer to 
potentially unlimited liability.  That would seem to violate Nozick’s own 
principles.  Under Nozick’s view, no greater body can have any rights that the 
individuals that comprise it do not possess.141  He evidently sees limited 
liability as violating this principle.  But, in fact, it does not.  It effectively 
retains an active participant-passive investor distinction that roughly maps to 
who caused harm by infringing on the rights of an individual. 
Nozick’s minimal state is almost certainly impractical.  Even if it is not, 
it is so tremendously dissimilar to the state as it exists today that we run into 
an issue similar to that which we ran into with Rawls.  The change to a 
minimal state would be so drastic that not just Burkean conservatives, highly 
concerned with the risk and cost of change, would blanche at the prospect.  A 
relatively well functioning system should not “be scrapped and reinvented 
 
 138. Cf. Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade?: A Corporate Executive’s 
Social Responsibilities with Regard to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 591 (2004) 
[hereinafter Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade?] (arguing shareholders have “no 
moral authority to authorize the CEO to do anything that [a sole] proprietor could not 
ethically do.”). 
 139. Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 
WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2015) (citing Stephen Padfield, Rehabilitating 
Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 333 (2014)). 
 140. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 133–34. 
 141. See id.  
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according to the fashionable theories of the day.”142  More directly relevant, 
the tremendous dissimilarity between our state and a minimal state makes it 
very difficult to use Nozick’s work to meaningfully distinguish between 
government interventions: almost all will fail to pass muster.  While liberalism 
provides valuable insights into a per se rule for violations of positive law, it is 
not perfect nor is it the only perspective worth discussing. 
C.  Communitarian Models 
Given the rise of populism and illiberalism in the United States (both on 
the political right and on the political left),143 there is value in considering 
perspectives other than liberalism.  The rise of populism and illiberalism may 
be due in part to a class bias associated with reliance on liberalism.  Non-
liberal models other than utilitarianism may also be underappreciated due to 
both the prevalence of utilitarianism in corporate scholarship and a class bias 
toward liberalism.  In particular, a focus on liberal individualism may 
obfuscate the dangers of a breakdown in civil society, something toward 
which communitarianism is better orientated.  Given those concerns, this 
Section will also consider two communitarian models.  The first is a populist 
modification of Charles Taylor’s democratic communitarianism.144  The 
second is Catholic Social Thought. 
 
 142. PINKER, supra note 109, at 184 (describing Burke’s philosophy). 
 143. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Opinion: America’s Democracy has Become 
Illiberal, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/america-is-becoming-a-land-of-less-liber 
ty/2016/12/29/2a91744c-ce09-11e6-a747-d03044780a02_story.html?utm_term=.947 
049d8545a [perma.cc/7C5X-AEN7] (arguing that the “liberty and law” half of liberal 
democracy is, in the United States and abroad, “vanishing, leaving just the outer, 
democratic shell”).  Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed reforms that would create 
criminal culpability for executives of large corporations who “negligently permit or 
fail to prevent” violations of law by the corporation and would require executives of 
very large corporations to certify that no lawbreaking was occurring in the company. 
Kevin LaCroix, Senator Warren’s Proposed Executive Liability Legislation is 




 144. See Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 774–75 (providing the label and 
associating it with Charles Taylor). 
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1.  Populist Communitarianism 
Proponents of communitarianism see liberalism as overemphasizing 
individualism at the expense of the community as a whole.145  Democratic 
communitarianism elevates “the social institutions that shape the community 
as a whole” above “the value of individual autonomy.”146  Democratic 
communitarianism, unlike utilitarianism, shares with liberalism “a 
commitment to a foundational premise of societal self-determination.”147  But 
under this view, we can only be free by shaping our society “through 
instruments of common decision.”148  Paradoxically, it is coming together to 
decide how we bind ourselves that “is an essential part of the exercise of 
freedom.”149 
The individual is no longer the “foundational democratic unit,” as with 
liberalism; under democratic communitarianism, it is the community as a 
whole.150  The idea that “society is best served by political decisions that 
reflect the preferences of the entire community”151 is closely related to the 
conception of virtue theory in business ethics, which sees managers as owing 
duties to society as a whole.152  It is unclear, though, that “society as a whole” 
is the appropriate definition of “community” even for communitarianism.  
Democratic communitarians believe that the state can best serve the interests 
of society by adopting policies designed to promote human interaction as a 
part of broader society.153  That interaction largely takes place not in some 
abstract “community as a whole” but rather through smaller communal 
entities.  Given that, the “community as a whole” is of limited utility.  A large 
assortment of smaller communal entities serve an even greater role in shaping 
an individual’s identity, and the shaping of identity is to a great degree driven 
by individual choices. 
 
 145. Id. at 774. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS VOL. 2 187, 208 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1985). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 775. 
 151. Id. at 774; see also TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 208 (asserting that certain 
issues “can only be effectively decided by society as a whole”). 
 152. See Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks & Bus. Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits “Just 
Right”, 23 J. CORP. L. 245, 247 (1998) [hereinafter Fort, Goldilocks] (characterizing 
communitarian theories as “the necessary partners of virtue theory”). 
 153. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 775; see also TAYLOR, supra note 148, 
at 205 (arguing that individuals only acquire their identities by interacting with other 
humans as part of a broader society). 
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Democratic communitarianism only supports protecting individual 
autonomy if doing so does not undermine communal attachments, which 
democratic communitarians see as so important to shaping choices by 
individuals.154  Democratic communitarians believe that laws should promote 
communal attachments rather than atomistic individual autonomy.155  It 
follows logically, then, that laws should not discourage communal 
attachments.  Laws that “crowd out” civil society are to be assiduously 
avoided. 
Democratic communitarians shy from atomistic individual autonomy 
because they see “an individual’s identity as bound up with each person’s 
various communal attachments.”156  But if “living in society is a necessary 
condition of the development of rationality . . . or of becoming a fully 
responsible, autonomous being,”157 responsible, autonomous beings are a 
necessary condition for building a full society.  It is not clear that democratic 
communitarians appreciate the extent to which individuals and their 
individual choices are necessary to forming the smaller communal entities that 
make up civil society.   
Additionally, there is a tension between democratic communitarianism 
and pluralism.  We may have “a significant obligation to belong,”158 but what 
if we do not want to belong?  Democratic communitarianism ought to, at the 
very least, accept that people will want to change the small communal entities 
to which they belong, and in a free society, they must be permitted to do so.  
The irony in Taylor’s arguments against “atomism” is that it is individual 
freedom that best facilitates community building.159 
Taylor takes a pinched view of the communal entities that shape 
individual identity.  He focuses not on the smaller communal entities that 
allow a pluralistic society to thrive, and are arguably more important to civic 
society, but rather on the “bearers of our culture [such as] museums, 
symphony orchestras, universities, laboratories, political parties, law courts, 
representative assemblies, newspapers, publishing houses, television stations, 
and so on.”160  Churches, trade unions, and local Rotary Clubs are nowhere to 
be found.  Taylor’s communitarianism is a community by and for elites. 
 
 154. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 775. 
 155. See id. (“Communitarian theory is grounded in the belief that individual 
autonomy divorced from the communal ties that shape that autonomy is incoherent.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 189. 
 158. Id. at 206. 
 159. See NOZICK, supra note 71, at 334 (“Treating us with respect by respecting 
our rights, it allows us . . . to choose our life and to realize our ends . . . aided by the 
voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity.”). 
 160. TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 205. 
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Democratic communitarianism bears at least some resemblance to 
populism.  Populists, though, have not typically paid significant attention to 
corporate governance.161  With what this Article calls “democratic 
communitarianism,” I make three populist tweaks to Taylor’s democratic 
communitarianism to give it more salience given current trends.  First, I add 
a suspicion of “elites.”162  Populists worry that elites will seek to rig the game 
in their favor.163  Those elites include both large corporations164 and their 
directors and executives,165 but they probably include the managers of large 
public pension funds as well.166  This is a way of incorporating well-founded 
 
 161. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Curious Silence of Populists of Corporate 
Purpose and Social Responsibility, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM, STEPHEN 
BAINBRIDGE’S J. OF LAW, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE (July 12, 2018, 1:57 
PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2018/07/the-
curious-silence-of-populists-on-corporate-purpose-and-social-responsibility.html 
[perma.cc/WW96-CBK9] (noting the “great deal of discussion . . . about the need to 
reform big business” but “relatively little discussion of [corporate purpose] in the 
populist literature”). 
 162. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era, UCLA 
SCHOOL OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER SERIES: RESEARCH PAPER NO. 18-09 n. 15 (2018) 
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Populist Era], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr 
act_id=3237107 [perma.cc/32K5-V24X] (“[P]opulism is a worldview that sees 
corrupt elites standing in opposition to ordinary people.”) (relying on JOHN B. JUDIS, 
THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN 
AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 14 (2016)); see also RUSSELL KIRK, THE POLITICS OF 
PRUDENCE 144 (describing populism as “a revolt against the Smart Guys,” largely 
represented today by the Knowledge Class). 
 163. See Robert D. Atkinson et al., How Tech Populism is Undermining 
Innovation, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.: REPORT (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www2.itif.org/2015-tech-populism.pdf [perma.cc/CC9K-DMLQ] (“The 
populist view is that elites, especially big business and big government, will prevent 
useful rules from being established – or, if those rules are established, will find ways 
to bypass them at the expense of the broader public.”); see also Bainbridge, Populist 
Era, supra note 162, at 13 (“A 2005 Harris Poll found that ‘big business’ was the 
social institution the largest number of respondents identified as having too much 
political power.”) (citing EVAN OSBORNE, THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE 
MOVEMENT: CORPORATIONS AND THE PEOPLE WHO HATE THEM 197 (2009)). 
 164. See, e.g., Greg Coleridge, The System Isn’t Broken, It’s Fixed: Ending Big 
Money and Corporations in Our Elections, 44 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 541, 557 (2013). 
 165. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Populist Era, supra note 162, at 7 (“Populists 
historically have viewed corporate managers and directors as elites opposed to the best 
interests of the people.”). 
 166. Cf. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 29 (Princeton University Press 1994) (“By 
populism . . . I mean to refer to a widespread attitude that large institutions and 
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concerns about what economically-minded utilitarians would label as agency 
costs and regulatory capture.   
Second, I add a bias toward smaller communal entities over the 
community as a whole.  “Smaller communal entities” are also known as 
“voluntary associations,”167 “little platoons,”168 “wee little bowls,”169 or 
simply “associations.”170  Adding a bias toward smaller communal entities 
better provides for pluralism,171 and it recognizes the importance of these 
smaller communal entities to civil society.172  To put it in utilitarian terms: 
 
accumulations of centralized economic power are inherently undesirable and should 
be reduced even if concentration is productive.”). 
 167. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 48 (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks 2000) (citing ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513–17 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence 
trans., Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1969)). 
 168. BURKE, supra note 73, at 44 (Dover 2006); but see James McElroy, Knock It 
Off With the ‘Little Platoons’ Already, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE (June 28, 
2018), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/knock-it-off-with-the-
little-platoons-already/ [perma.cc/3KAB-353A] (arguing the original Burke quote 
does not support the use of the term “little platoons” to apply broadly to smaller 
communal entities). 
 169. Fort, Goldilocks, supra note 152, at 246–47 (arguing that “business ethics 
requires authentic communities that respect individual autonomy” to serve as 
“mediating institutions” – Fort’s “wee little bowls”).  
 170. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835). 
 171. Cf. Martin H. Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic 
Skepticism and the Theory of Free Expression, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 691, 699 (2015) 
(“[A]cceptance of pluralism . . . facilitates human flourishing far more than an 
exclusively communitarian perspective does.”). 
 172. See Timothy L. Fort, Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious 
Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 173, 195–96 (1997) (arguing that “basic human social needs of 
affection, friendship, prestige, and recognition” have traditionally been “met by 
mediating institutions such as families, churches, and guilds”) (citations omitted).  The 
concern for smaller communal entities is one shared by Catholic Social Thought. See, 
e.g., POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, ¶ 2 (1891) (“The ancient workmen’s guilds 
were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place.”); id. 
¶¶ 36–38 (lauding workmen’s associations and “societies for mutual help” for drawing 
employers and workmen more closely together); POPE PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, 
¶ 37 (1931) (referencing the “gratifying increase and spread of associations among 
farmers); POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, ¶ 88 (1961) (encouraging the state to 
make special provision for artisan enterprises and cooperative associations via 
“instructions, taxes, credit facilities, social security, and insurance”); id. ¶ 146 
(encouraging farmers to “strive jointly to set up mutual-aid societies and professional 
associations”); POPE PAUL VI, Pacem in Terris, ¶ 24 (1963) (“[I]t is by all means 
necessary that a great variety of organizations and intermediate groups be established 
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they create positive externalities.173  One may question how well this resulting 
model aligns with the corporation.  UCLA Law Professor Stephen Bainbridge 
does not find the idea that large multinational corporations can perform the 
role of smaller communal entities as credible.174  Multinationals are owned by 
“a new class of absentee owners” who do not and cannot recognize their 
mutual obligations with local communities.175  This does not account for the 
role that corporate giving plays in the financing of smaller communal entities 
and for the importance of corporate employees in those entities, but that is 
probably less true for large multinationals than for local businesses.  Purely in 
terms of what produces the strongest possible array of smaller communal 
entities, there is much to be said for the populist ideal of small businesses 
“with local owners who [are] embedded in the community.”176 
 
which are capable of achieving a goal which an individual cannot effectively obtain 
by himself.”); POPE PAUL VI, Gaudium et Spes, ¶ 75 (1965) (“Rulers must be careful 
not to hamper the development of family, social or cultural groups, nor that of 
intermediate bodies or organizations.”); POPE JOHN PAUL II, Laborem Exercens, ¶ 20 
(1981) (“All these rights . . . give rise to yet another right: the right of association, that 
is, to form associations for the purpose of defending the vital interests of those 
employed in the various professions.  These associations are called labor or trade 
unions . . . . The experience of history teaches that organizations of this type are an 
indispensable element of social life.”); POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, ¶ 13 
(1991) (“[T]he social nature of man is not completely filled in the state, but is realized 
in various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic, 
social, political and cultural groups which stem from human nature itself and have 
their own autonomy, always with a view to the common good.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Jonathan Haidt, Moral Psychology and the Misunderstanding of 
Religion, EDGE (Sept. 21, 2007), https://www.edge.org/conversation/jonathan_haidt-
moral-psychology-and-the-misunderstanding-of-religion [perma.cc/6LET-RR2C] 
(arguing that churches, social fraternities, and college sports teams generate positive 
externalities). 
 174. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and the Corporation, 1 J. 
OF CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 595, 597 (2004) (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops 
and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILLANOVA J. L. & INV. MGMT. 3, 15 
(2002)); but see Fort, supra note 172, at 175, 196–201 (1997) (arguing that business 
can and should serve as “mediating institutions[,] communities which socialize their 
members[,] ‘mediating’ between the individual and society as a whole.”). 
 175. Bainbridge, Populist Era, supra note 162, at 14 (citing PETER KOLOZI, 
CONSERVATIVES AGAINST CAPITALISM: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO 
GLOBALIZATION 87 (2017)). 
 176. Id. at 15 (citations omitted); see also Fort, supra note 172, at 176 (“Although 
the process is traditionally associated with institutions such as family, church, and the 
local community, businesses ought to be mediating institutions as well.”) (citing 
Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating Institution, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 149, 156 
(1996)). 
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Third, I add a bias toward law and order.  This is perhaps only a small 
change from democratic communitarianism, which sets great store by laws 
passed by duly elected legislatures (and presumably would set even greater 
store by popular referendums).  But the bias towards law and order ties in with 
my first modification due to the common perception that the elite need not 
play by the same rules as the unwashed masses.177  And there is an additional 
element that goes beyond democratic communitarianism in deferring to legal 
authority and prizing stability.178  This also adds shades of civic 
republicanism.179   
Populist communitarianism has its advantages over Taylor’s democratic 
communitarianism, but it too is fatally flawed.  Concerns about elites are well 
founded, but a simple bias against elites fails to distinguish between elites 
whose status is earned by creating value180 and those engaged in rent-seeking.  
Too often populist policies hurt the very people they were supposed to 
protect.181  The emphasis on smaller communal entities can be difficult to 
square with populist rhetoric, which rarely mentions them and tends to focus 
 
 177. See supra note 164; see also Bainbridge, Populist Era, supra note 162, at 17 
(“[P]opulists have long believed that state law is too lax in regulating large 
corporations.”) (citations omitted). 
 178. Blue-collar families prize stability much more than novelty, in contrast with 
the managerial and professional elite. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, WHITE WORKING CLASS 28 
(Harvard Bus. Rev. Press 2017); see also The New Political Divide, and a Plan to 
Close It, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 25, 2017) https://www.economist.com/books-and-
arts/2017/03/25/the-new-political-divide-and-a-plan-to-close-it [perma.cc/B35K-
RS77] (distinguishing Anywheres who “value social and geographical mobility” from 
Somewheres who “value family, authority and nationality”) (emphasis added) 
(reviewing DAVID GOODHART, THE ROAD TO SOMEWHERE: THE POPULIST REVOLT 
AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICS 44 (Hurst 2017) (associated a question on the British 
Social Attitudes survey – “The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law 
is wrong” – and associated it with a subset of his populist Somewheres classification)). 
 179. See Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 797 (“Public action model adherents 
claim . . . the class action is justified solely because it aids in the enforcement of laws 
that implement broader purposes.”).  Rawls also displays a bias toward law and order. 
See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 94, at 340 (“Up to a certain point it is better that the law 
and its interpretation be settled than that it be settled rightly.”). 
 180. The ranks of the wealthiest people in the world are heavy with entrepreneurs. 
Catherine Clifford, Entrepreneurs Rank High Among the 50 Wealthiest People in the 
World, ENTREPRENEUR (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/270093 
[perma.cc/BXC9-PPWJ]. 
 181. Why Tariffs are Bad Taxes, THE ECONOMIST (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/31/why-tariffs-are-bad-
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instead on national unity.182  The emphasis on law and order appears Burkean 
in theory,183 but too often looks like mere meanness in practice.184  To the 
extent populism is driven by anti-immigration (or anti-immigrant) 
sentiment,185 it may be of limited utility for other issues. 
2. Catholic Social Thought 
The second non-liberal (and non-utilitarian) model I will consider comes 
from Catholic Social Thought (“CST”).  I include Catholic Social Thought  
for four reasons.  First, there are well over 50 million Catholics in the United 
States,186 and the hierarchical structure and long history of the Church allows 
for a central body to build a political theory over time.187  Second, the Church 
 
 182. See, e.g., Francis Fukuyama, The Rise of Populist Nationalism, CREDIT 
SUISSE (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.credit-suisse.com/corporate/en/articles/news-
and-expertise/francis-fukuyama-the-rise-of-populist-nationalism-201801.html 
[perma.cc/Z4QS-DTX6] (tying populism to nationalism and pointing to the 
institutions of liberal democracy as bulwarks against the two). 
 183. See Russell Kirk, Edmund Burke and the Principle of Order, THE RUSSELL 
KIRK CTR. FOR CULTURAL RENEWAL (Nov. 30, 2009), https://kirkcenter.org/by-
kirk/burke-principle-of-order-1952/ [perma.cc/7JQT-MEJU] (tying Burke’s political 
philosophy to the rule of law and especially to a distinct concept of order). 
 184. See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Family Separation May Have Hit Thousands More 
Migrant Children Than Reported, THE N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/family-separation-trump-administration-
migrants.html [perma.cc/C4RP-THD2] (reporting that a new zero tolerance 
immigration policy resulted in a “‘sharp increase’ in the number of children separated 
from a parent or guardian.”) 
 185. See generally Eric Kaufmann, WHITESHIFT: POPULISM, IMMIGRATION, AND 
THE FUTURE OF WHITE MAJORITIES (Harry N. Abrams 2019) (arguing that populism 
on the right is closely tied to how important voters consider restricting immigration 
and that the rise of the populist right in Europe is closely tied to a rise in concern over 
immigration). 
 186. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 
table 75 (2012), 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/populatio
n.html [perma.cc/W2UY-QUJ6]. 
 187. Catholic Social Thought, then, is tied to a large political body in way that the 
Christian Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr or the liberation theology of Jose Porfirio 
Miranda are not.  This is no guarantee of salience even among Catholics, of course, 
but it gives a stronger base from which to work.  Catholic Social Thought is formed 
in significant part by seven major encyclicals, or papal letters on Catholic doctrine, 
and one pastoral constitution. See POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 192; 
POPE PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 172; POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et 
Magistra, supra note 172; POPE PAUL VI, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172; POPE PAUL 
VI, Populorum Progression (1967); POPE JOHN PAUL II, Laborem Exercens, supra 
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has long worked to position CST as an alternative to both liberalism and 
socialism.188  Third, CST is persuasive as a matter of first principles.  Fourth, 
CST is more concrete than other models, and thus more readily applied.189  
CST “focuse[s] more directly on social problems and concrete issues of 
justice” than the work of Rawls and Nozick.190  CST also has a long history 
as an alternative to liberalism.191   
CST has a number of other advantages that make it attractive as a model 
of political theory.  It has an international perspective relative to other 
 
note 172; and POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 172.  All quotes are 
pulled from DAVID J. O’BRIEN & THOMAS A. SHANNON, EDS., CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
THOUGHT: ENCYCLICALS AND DOCUMENTS FROM POPE LEO XIII TO POPE FRANCIS 
(Orbis Books 3d ed. 2016). 
 188. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, Laborem Exercens, supra note 172, at ¶ 14 
(1981) (“[T]he above principle . . . diverges radically from the program of collectivism 
as proclaimed by Marxism . . . .  At the same time it differs from the program of 
capitalism practiced by liberalism.”); POPE PAUL VI, Octogesima Adveniens ¶ 26 
(1971) (“[T]he Christian who wishes to live his faith in a political activity cannot 
without contradicting himself adhere to ideological systems which radically or 
substantially go against his faith and his concept of man.  He cannot adhere to the 
Marxist ideology . . . nor can he adhere to the liberal ideology.”); POPE PAUL VI, 
Populorum Progression, supra note 187, at ¶ 58 (1967) (“One must recognize that it 
is the fundamental principle of liberalism, as the rule for commercial exchange, which 
is questioned here.”); POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 23 
(1961) (“For the unregulated competition which so-called liberals espouse, or the 
class struggle in the Marxist sense, are utterly opposed to Christian teaching and also 
to the very nature of man.”); POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 172, at ¶ 4 
(1891) (“[Socialists] are . . . emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful 
possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion in the 
community.”). 
 189. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis ¶ 41 (1987) (“[Catholic 
Social Thought] is a doctrine aimed at guiding people’s behavior.”) (emphasis added). 
 190. LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 66. 
 191. See, e.g., Gerald J. Russello, Catholic Social Thought and the Large 
Multinational Corporation, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 107, 107 (2007) (“In particular, 
CST offers a critique of classical liberal economics and its conception of persons as 
autonomous consumers or shareholders seeking to maximize their preferences.”) 
(citing Mark Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of 
Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. L. STUD. 35 (2005)); see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, 
Laborem Exercens, supra note 172, at ¶ 14 (“[T]he right to private property is 
subordinated to the right to common use.”); POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progression, 
supra note 187, at ¶ 58 (“One must recognize that it is the fundamental principle of 
liberalism, as the rule for commercial exchange, which is questioned here.”) 
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American-, or at least Western-, centric models.192  CST recognizes people as 
self-interested.193  CST sees people as simultaneously individuals with 
personal “rights and obligations [that] are universal and unviolable”194 and as 
members of society with social duties.195  Using CST also allows us to 
introduce shades of objective truth communitarianism196 and virtue ethics.197  
CST acknowledges the legitimate role of profits.198  But per the Catechism of 
the Catholic Church, businesspeople must consider the common good in 
addition to profits.199 
CST maintains a number of hallmarks across the decades.  Like 
Rawls,200 CST focuses particularly on the poor201 and concerns itself with 
 
 192. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 178 
(“[T]he Church by divine right pertains to all nations.  This is confirmed by the fact 
that she already is everywhere on earth and strives to embrace all peoples.”). 
 193. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 229 (“[T]here is deeply rooted in each man an instinctive 
and immoderate love of his own interests.”). 
 194. POPE JOHN PAUL II, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 9. 
 195. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 30–31 (“[I]t also follows that in human society to one man’s 
right there corresponds a duty in all other persons: the duty, namely, of acknowledging 
and respecting the right in question. . . .  A well-ordered human society requires that 
men recognize and observe their mutual rights and duties.”). 
 196. See Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 774 (“‘Objective truth 
communitarianism’ posits that there are objectively good and bad policy decisions.”). 
 197. Bainbridge, CST, supra note 174, at 600 (“Catholic social teaching is the 
tradition of virtue ethics.”) 
 198. POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 172, at ¶ 35. 
 199. UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH ¶ 2432 (2d ed. 1997); see also Leo L. Clarke & Edward C. Lyons, The 
Corporate Common Good: The Right and Obligation of Managers to Do Good to 
Others, 32 U. OF DAYTON L. REV. 275, 282 (2007) (“[A]ccording to Catholic social 
principles the corporate common good is not simply based on a concept denoting a 
full, i.e., fair, economic distribute of profits among stakeholders, but reflects the full 
range of ‘human and moral factors’ that stakeholders may rightfully take into account 
in pursuing their moral duty to ‘be at the service of the whole of society.’”); Vincent 
J. Miller, The Common Good and the Market, AMERICA MAG. (April 1, 2019) 
(“[P]apal social teaching has consistently stressed that markets are limited and 
imperfect tools with potentially destructive aspects (inequality and exclusion, 
environmental degradation, erosion of community). For this reason, they are but one 
aspect of broader social flourishing, one that must be yoked to the common good 
through other modalities of human freedom.”). 
 200. Supra Part III.B.1. 
 201. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 56 
(“Considerations of justice and equity, however, can at times demand that those 
involved in civil government give more attention to the less fortunate members of the 
community, since they are less able to defend their rights and to assert their legitimate 
claims.”); POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 20 (asserting that 
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distributive justice.202  CST recognizes the inherent dignity of work203 as well 
as the inherent dignity of a human person and its tie to liberty.204  CST also 
recognizes the link between liberty and virtue205 and the importance of liberty 
to democracy.206  CST recognizes that man is a social animal.207  People and 
communities are shaped by their shared past.208  CST recognizes that humans 
benefit from the actions of their predecessors and that this creates an ethical 
duty to work for the benefit of future humans.209 
 
the State should be especially diligent in safeguarding the rights of “the weaker, such 
as workers, women, and children”); see also U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic 
Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy 
¶ 24 (1986) (“The fundamental moral criterion for all economic decisions, policies, 
and institutions is this: They must be at the service of all people, especially the poor.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 202. POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 73–74 
(“[V]igilance should be exercised and effective steps taken that class differences 
arising from disparity of wealth not be increased, but lessened so far as possible. . . .  
“[T]he economic prosperity of any people is to be assessed not so much from the sum 
total of goods and wealth possessed as from the distribution of goods according to 
norms of justice.”). 
 203. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, Laborem Exercens, supra note 172, at ¶ 9 (“And 
yet in spite of all this toil – perhaps, in a sense, because of it – work is a good thing 
for man.”). 
 204. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 17 (“[M]an’s 
dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free choice.”); id. at ¶ 59 (“All 
of these considerations demand too, that, within the limits of morality and the general 
welfare, a man be free to search for the truth, voice his mind, and publicize it; that he 
be free to practice any art he chooses; and finally that he have appropriate access to 
information about public affairs.  It is not the function of public authority to determine 
what the proper nature of forms of human culture should be.”). 
 205. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 17 (“Only in freedom can man direct himself toward 
goodness. . . . Man achieves such dignity when . . . he pursues his goal in a 
spontaneous choice of what is good.”). 
 206. See, e.g., id. ¶ 73 (“[T]he protection of personal rights is a necessary 
condition for the active participation of citizens, whether as individuals or collectively, 
in the life and government of the state.”). 
 207. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 31 (“Since 
men are social by nature they are meant to live with others and to work for one 
another’s welfare.”); POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶ 36 
(“[M]an finds his true identity only in his social milieu.”). 
 208. POPE PAUL VI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 53. 
 209. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶ 17 (“We 
have inherited from past generations, and we have benefitted from the work of our 
contemporaries: for this reason we have obligations toward all, and we cannot refuse 
to interest ourselves in those who will come after us to enlarge the human family.”). 
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CST remains highly relevant today.  The term “social justice” was first 
used by Pope Pius XI in 1931 in Quadragesimo Anno.210  Perhaps more 
importantly, Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Quadragesimo Anno also introduced 
the concept of subsidiarity.211  Subsidiarity is the idea that the lowest level of 
organization possible to address an issue should be the one to do so.212  Social 
justice has obvious salience, and subsidiarity is an implicit guiding principle 
in the constitutional design of the United States213 and an explicit guiding 
principle in the constitutional design of the European Union.214  CST makes a 
moral case for subsidiarity, but there is sound economic reasoning that favors 
subsidiarity as well.215 
CST strikes a middle ground between liberalism’s intense focus on the 
individual and democratic communitarianism’s rejection of the relevancy of 
 
 210. See O’BRIEN & SHANNON, supra note 187, at 42 (“A new phrase – social 
justice – appeared in Quadragesimo Anno to describe the type of justice that demanded 
due recognition of the common good, a good which included, and did not contradict, 
the authentic good of each and every person.”).  The term appears in ¶ 58: “Each class, 
then, must receive its due share, and the distribution of created goods must be brought 
into conformity with the demands of the common good and social justice.” POPE PIUS 
XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172.  
 211. POPE PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 172 at ¶ ¶ 79–80.  
Subsidiarity was reaffirmed by Mater et Magistra. POPE JOHN XXIII, supra note 172, 
at ¶ 53. 
 212. POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 53. 
 213. Compare George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in 
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 331, 337 
(Stating that “[a]lthough subsidiarity has not figured as a term in United States 
constitutionalism, it plainly touches on issues of enduring concern to the federalism 
balance in [the United States] as well,” but concluding that federalism in the U.S. is 
“left entirely to an unstructured political process” and that “no real attempt has been 
made to ensure respect for subsidiarity as such”) with Steven G. Calabresi & Lucy D. 
Bickford, Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from U.S. Constitutional Law, in 
FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 8 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds. 2014) 
(arguing that, after the “U.S. neo-federalist revival” of the late 1990s, “Bermann’s 
claim is thus no longer sustainable, if it ever was”). 
 214. Bermann, supra note 213, at 334 (1994) (describing subsidiarity as a central 
principle for European Union); see also Calabresi & Bickford, supra note 213, at 6 
(“The principle of subsidiarity formally entered EU law in the 1992 Treaty of 
Maastricht and was reaffirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Friedrich von Hayek, The Price System as a Mechanism for Using 
Knowledge, in COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: MODELS AND CASES 29–40 
(Homewood, Ill. 1985) (“The knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make 
use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals 
possess.”). 
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the individual.216  For example, the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
Church defines the common good as “the sum total of social conditions which 
allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment 
more fully and more easily.”217  Private property must be protected, but use 
of that property should consider the common good, so restrictions or takings 
done for the common good may be justified.218   
CST recognizes a role for the state, which means it must accept the 
bounds of the law at least some of the time.  Law is valuable because it 
“affords protection to the citizens both in the enjoyment of their own rights 
and in the fulfillment of their duties.”219  Like populist communitarianism,220 
CST is concerned with elites using their influence to flout the law to the 
detriment of society.221  CST has a great respect for using the law to enforce 
and promote social norms, even for things as picayune as speed limits.222  But 
laws only “derive their binding force from the law of nature” if they are just.223  
 
 216. Milton Friedman criticized CST for a “collectivist moral strain.” Milton 
Friedman, Good Ends, Bad Means, in THE CATHOLIC CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY 99 (Thomas M. Gannon ed. 1987). 
 217. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL 
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ¶ 164, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_cou 
ncils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en 
.html [perma.cc/HQ42-P9L2]. 
 218. Compare POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 71 (arguing 
private property “constitutes a kind of prerequisite for civil liberties”) with POPE PAUL 
VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶ 24 (arguing expropriation of property 
sometimes necessary for the common good where it is “extensive, unused, or poorly 
used, or because they bring hardship to peoples or are detrimental to the interests of 
the country”).  The potential justifications for expropriations of property in Populorum 
progressio are very broad.  But any arguments for expropriation of corporate assets 
on the basis they are “poorly used” are countered by the pressures of the equity 
markets and by the possibility of a hostile takeover, not to mention the poor record of 
expropriated corporate assets being used for the common good. 
 219. POPE JOHN XXIII, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 68. 
 220. Supra Part III.c.1. 
 221. POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 4 (“Yet there are those 
who, while possessing grand and rather noble sentiments, nevertheless in reality live 
always as if they cared nothing for the needs of society. Many in various places even 
make light of social laws and precepts, and do not hesitate to resort to various frauds 
and deceptions in avoiding just taxes or other debts due to society.”). 
 222. Id. (“Others think little of certain norms of social life, for example those 
designed for the protection of health, or laws establishing speed limits; they do not 
even avert to the fact that by such indifference they imperil their own life and that of 
others.”). 
 223. POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 172, at  ¶ 8 (“Civil laws . . . as 
long as they are just, derive their binding force from the law of nature.  The authority 
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The people are “conscience-bound to obey” just laws.224  But legitimate 
political authority can only “be exercised within the limits of morality and on 
behalf of the dynamically conceived common good, according to a juridical 
order enjoying legal status.”225  But lack of legitimate political authority alone 
is insufficient to relieve one from the obligation to obey.  While people should 
obey even illegitimate political authority “to the extent that the objective 
common good demands,”226 that only goes so far.  Law is only binding when 
it accords with reason,227 and people have the right “to defend their own rights 
and those of their fellow citizens against” abuses of authority.228 
CST has taken a much dimmer view of free agreement among parties 
than, say, Nozick or the modern law and economics utilitarians.  If workers 
are not compensated according to the laws of justice and equity, then “justice 
is violated in labor agreements, even though they are entered into freely by 
both sides.”229  Traditionally, CST has favored a “living” or “family” wage 
over a contract wage.230  But given the economics, this frequently counsels 
against the regulation of wages: if raising the minimum wage results in 
automation and fewer entry-level jobs,231 then leaving be the minimum wage 
 
of divine law adds its sanction, forbidding us in the gravest terms even to covet that 
which is another’s.” (emphasis added)). 
 224. POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 74. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. POPE LEO XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 172, at ¶ 38. 
 228. POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 74. 
 229. POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 18. 
 230. See, e.g., POPE PIUS XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 172, at ¶ 2(“[T]he 
wage scale must be regulated with a view to the economic welfare of the whole 
people.”); POPE JOHN XXIII, Mater et Magistra, supra note 172, at ¶ 71 (“We 
therefore consider it Our duty to reaffirm that the remuneration of work is not 
something that can be left to the laws of the marketplace . . . . [W]orkers must be paid 
a wage which allows them to live a truly human life and to fulfill their family 
obligations in a worthy manner.”). 
 231. See, e.g., David Neumark & William L. Wascher, Minimum Wages and 
Employment: A Review of Evidence form the New Minimum Wage Research, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 121 (2006) (“[T]he oft-stated assertion that the new 
minimum wage research fails to support the conclusion that the minimum wage 
reduces the employment of low-skilled workers is clearly incorrect.  Indeed, in our 
view, the preponderance of the evidence points to disemployment effects.”); Grace 
Lordan & David Neumark, People Versus Machines: The Impact of Minimum Wages 
on Automatable Jobs, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (2017), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23667 [perma.cc/C5ST-3WWM] (“[I]ncreasing the 
minimum wage decreases significantly the share of automatable employment held by 
low-skilled workers, and increases the likelihood that low-skilled workers in 
automatable jobs become unemployed.”). 
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is the more just result.  And evaluation of efforts to provide for a family wage 
through government subsidies, such as the earned income tax credit, must take 
into account the disincentive to work,232 given the value that CST places on 
vocation. 
To say that the “fundamental moral criterion for all economic decisions” 
is that they “must be at the service of all people”233 is odd given that economic 
decisions are typically only at the services of the parties involved.  Economic 
transactions in a free market create wealth, but absent positive externalities, 
they create wealth for the parties involved, not for “all people.”  Indeed, even 
where positive externalities are present, those positive externalities will likely 
only benefit some people, not all people.  But how can you criticize, morally, 
a transaction that leaves some people better off and hurts no one?  The “must” 
language used in the Bishop’s Letter would appear to do just that.234 
CST even goes so far as to state that “[i]f the positions of the contracting 
parties are too unequal, the consent of the parties does not suffice to guarantee 
the justice of their contract.”235  This has obvious parallels to the 
unconscionability doctrine, which requires unequal bargaining power as the 
first element.236  But the focus on relative bargaining power tends to ignore 
the walkaway option for the party with lesser bargaining power and the 
economic incentives for the party with greater bargaining power to still 
provide value to the other party.237  The sort of “one-sided contracts” that tend 
to result from disparities in bargaining power can be, and frequently are, 
economically efficient.238 
 
 232. But see Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Behavioral Responses to Taxes: 
Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply, NBER Working Paper No. 11729 (2005), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w11729 [perma.cc/KJ8U-7QP3] (surveying the 
literature and summarizing it as showing that the EITC encourages people to enter the 
work force and does not cause them to work fewer hours). 
 233. U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Economic Justice for All, supra note 201, at ¶ 24 
(emphasis in original). 
 234. Id.  
 235. POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶¶ 58–59. 
 236. See Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of 
the Poor”, 102 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1383, 1385 (2014) (discussing the 
unconscionability doctrine in the United States as established by Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). 
 237. Id. at 1402.  
 238. See generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided 
Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006) (focusing 
on the potential reputational costs to opportunistic businesses). 
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CST may be better on subsidiarity in theory than in practice.  In practice, 
the Church is arguably too quick to endorse top-down solutions.239  And the 
Church’s implementation of subsidiarity is arguably self-serving.  The Church 
presumably interprets subsidiary as requiring both parochial schools and the 
Vatican’s international leadership role be protected.240 
CST’s persuasive power is limited because it is inextricably tied to 
religion.  Some people will always reject it for that reason.  But liberalism 
itself demands that we not reject it solely on the basis of its religious context 
and substance.  Early American discourse on liberty, for example, put 
religious liberty on equal footing with economic liberty and free expression.241  
One need not accept the theological implications of CST to accept it as a 
persuasive, communitarian model that can be justified using public reason. 
Each of the five models of political theory, then, is deeply imperfect.  
But each, in turn, has something to offer.  Therefore, considering all five 
models will provide a richer understanding of a given issue.  Indeed, we will 
see that each provides some illumination on the optimal rule for director 
fiduciary liability for unlawful corporate conduct.  Before applying those 
models to the issue at hand, though, let us consider several high-profile, recent 
 
 239. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 172, at ¶ 58 
(“There is a growing feeling . . . that this increasing internationalization of the 
economy ought to be accompanied by effective international agencies which will 
oversee and direct the economy to the common good, something that an individual 
state, even if it were the most powerful on earth, would not be in a position to do.”); 
POPE PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, supra note 191, at ¶ 50 (“A planned program 
is of course better and more effective than occasional aid left to individual good 
will.”); POPE PIUS XI, Guadium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 65 (“Growth must not be 
allowed merely to follow a kind of automatic course resulting from the economic 
activity of individuals.”); id ¶ 79 (suggesting that a “competent and sufficiently 
powerful authority at the international level” is necessary to prevent war and that its 
existence would remove the defense justification for military force); id ¶ 86 (“The 
international community . . . should regulate economic relations throughout the world 
so that they can unfold in a way that is fair.”). 
 240. But see POPE JOHN PAUL II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 172, at ¶ 53 
(“During the last hundred years the church has repeatedly expressed her thinking, 
while closely following the continuing development of the social question.  She has 
certainly not done this in order to recover former privileges or to impose her own 
vision.”). 
 241. Anastasia P. Boden, Caricature Assassination: Andrew Koppelman and the 
Myth of Tough Luck Libertarianism, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 513, 547 (2015) 
(internal citations omitted); cf. RAWLS, supra note 94, at 17 (“[W]e are confident that 
religious intolerance [is] unjust.  We think that we have examined these things with 
care and have reached what we believe is an impartial judgment not likely to be 
distorted by an excessive attention to our own interests.”). 
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examples of unlawful corporate behavior at the tacit direction of or with the 
alleged knowledge of the board. 
IV.   RIPPED FROM THE HEADLINES 
Corporate lawbreaking inhabits a greater range than a dichotomy 
between a package firm instructing its drivers to cut delivery time by illegally 
double-parking242 and a manufacturing company illegally polluting a river.243  
Penn Law Professor Elizabeth Pollman has identified numerous other 
examples of corporations bumping up against the law.244  In addition to 
wrongdoing without social benefit (beyond corporate profit), Pollman groups 
unlawful corporate behavior that may have social benefits into the following 
categories: innovation and entrepreneurship,245 battles of federalism,246 moral 
stances and claims for rights,247 and general business lobbying.248  It is rare, 
but not unknown, for a corporate board to direct a violation of positive law.249  
This is, of course, much rarer than a corporate violation of positive law for the 
simple reason that the vast majority of corporate actions are not taken at the 
direction of the board.250  But it does happen, and recent events have given us 
more interesting examples than double-parking. 
This Section will discuss four recent instances of corporate violations of 
positive law either at the board’s direction or with the board’s knowledge: 
Uber and its guerilla regulatory tactics, the “legal” marijuana industry, 
derivative suits against Google directors related to handling of executives 
accused of sexual harassment, and the decisions by Dick’s Sporting Goods 
and Walmart to stop selling long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds in 
defiance of state civil rights acts barring age discrimination. 
A.  Uber and Its Guerilla Regulatory Tactics 
The taxi industry in the United States is heavily regulated, but that 
regulation was designed for a different service than that envisioned by 
 
 242. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 272–73 
(2002). 
 243. Strine, supra note 6, at 652 n.71. 
 244. Pollman, supra note 8, at 729–48. 
 245. Id. at 732–39. 
 246. Id. at 739–42. 
 247. Id. at 742–46. 
 248. Id. at 747–48. 
 249. Id. at 722–48.  
 250. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 34, at 1494 (noting that boards rarely take 
“affirmative action on individual matters”). 
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Uber.251  Recognizing the threat that the regulatory landscape posed for its 
business model, “Uber approached each launch like a guerilla attack,” 
launching its services in a given jurisdiction without first meeting with the 
relevant regulators.252  After establishing the value of its service to consumers, 
Uber would then leverage its customers as grassroots political support for the 
regulatory change that would allow it to continue to operate.253  In the process, 
it ignored a cease-and-desist letter from the San Francisco Metro Transit 
Authority and California Public Utilities Commission and “repeatedly paid 
fines and settlements as a cost of doing business.”254  Ignoring legacy 
regulations was so central to Uber’s corporate strategy that it defies belief that 
it did not take place without the approval of the board.255  Indeed, according 
to Bradley Tusk, the political consultant who helped design Uber’s strategy, 
it became known as Travis’ Law, named after Uber co-founder and then-CEO 
Travis Kalancik.256  Tusk reports that Kalanick characterized the need for 
Uber’s strategy as existential: “If we have to ask for something that’s already 
legal, we’ll never roll out.”257  But when Kalanick described the legal stakes 
as “fines[, t]owing cars[, s]tuff like that,” Tusk responded that “those are just 
costs of doing business.”258 
Uber’s actions would, at the very least, fall afoul of the Seventh Circuit’s 
approach applying Delaware precedent in In re Abbott to hold that failing to 
stop known violations of the law is intentional behavior on the part of the 
board.259  The Fourth Circuit, applying California law, even held that non-
illegal conduct that intentionally skirted the regulatory authority of a 
government agency was bad faith.260  But it is hard to believe that Uber’s 
skirting of the law resulted in harm to the corporation: at one time Uber was 
 
 251. Rafi Mohammed, Regulation Is Hurting Cabs and Helping Uber, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (July 9, 2014), https://hbr.org/201 4/07/regulation-is-hurting-cabs-and-helping-
uber [perma.cc/U7Y4-FUHW] (“Much of [Uber’s] spectacular growth has been 
fueled by outdated regulation.”).   
 252. Pollman, supra note 8, at 734 (quoting ADAM LASHINSKY, WILD RIDE: INSIDE 
UBER’S QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION 97 (2017)).  
 253. Id. at 723; see also BRADLEY TUSK, THE FIXER: MY ADVENTURES SAVING 
STARTUPS FROM DEATH BY POLITICS 109 (2018). 
 254. Pollman, supra note 8, at 722. 
 255. Id. at 734.  
 256. TUSK, supra note 253, at 109. 
 257. Id. at 108. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See supra Part II. 
 260. In re Landmark Land Co., 76 F.3d 553, 565 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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the most valuable private company in the world.261  In skirting taxi cab 
regulations, Uber has also created social benefits.262 
Uber raises an interesting question regarding a per se standard for 
violations of law: how should it treat a series of aggressive, questionable, but 
not clearly illegal business choices? 
B.  The “Legal” Marijuana Industry 
Medical marijuana is legal under state law in thirty-three states, 
including New York and Florida.263  Recreational marijuana is also legal 
under state law in eleven states, including California and now Illinois.264  But 
marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law.265  
 
 261. Zack Friedman, These 197 Tech Companies Are the World’s Most Valuable 
Unicorns, FORBES (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/05/30/tech-
unicorns/#29079f871179 [perma.cc/8CLQ-5U49]; but see Heather Somerville, Uber 
narrows loss but still a long way from profitability, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uber-results/uber-narrows-loss-but-still-a-long-way-
from-profitability-idUSL1N1V611I [perma.cc/A7FX-QBG4] (Uber may have 
“narrowed” its net loss to $891 million for a quarter, but it remains an unprofitable 
business). 
 262. See Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 
ONLINE 85, 86, 90–91 (2017) (stating that Uber has “created a far more efficient 
market for car-hire services,” has had “obvious positive effects on consumer welfare,” 
has reduced environmental harms by reducing “consumers’ incentives to purchase 
automobiles,” may reduce drunk driving, and that its model “may enable Uber and 
regulators to ensure safety and root out discrimination against passengers with relative 
ease”); Alissa Walker, Lyft and Uber Serve Low-Income Communities Better than 
Taxis, Says Sudy, CURBED (July 2, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/7/2/1751153 
0/lyft-ride-hailing-taxis-discrimination [perma.cc/C7B9-43KQ] (describing study 
suggesting that taxi companies were more likely to engage in discriminatory behavior 
than Uber and Lyft).  As a maturing, now publicly-held company, Uber is starting to 
play nice with law enforcement. Sarah Frier, Uber Wants the Law on Its Side, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic 
les/2019-04-23/uber-shares-ride-data-to-get-law-enforcement-on-its-side 
[perma.cc/TQ5K-PP63]. 
 263. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 27, 
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx 
[perma.cc/D8T8-7JX2]. 
 264. Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx 
[perma.cc/U7G5-ASGE]. 
 265. 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I(C)(10) (2018); Leah Asmelash & Melissa 
Alonso, Illinois Lieutenant Governor Beats Long Lines to Become One of the First to 
Legally Buy Weed in the State, CNN (Jan. 1, 2020, 5:12 PM), 
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The cultivation and sale of marijuana is a growth business nonetheless.  
Marijuana dispensaries outnumber Starbucks in some locales,266 and a 
marijuana business might be worth hundreds of millions of dollars.267  State 
legalization lowers the risk of selling marijuana, but it does not insulate 
dispensaries from the threat of federal raids.268  And as marijuana remains 
prohibited under federal law, the directors of any marijuana business 
organized as a corporation would fall afoul of a per se rule for allowing it to 
remain in the marijuana business.269  Even if the business is incorporated in a 
state where marijuana is legal, violations of federal positive law would still 
presumably trigger the per se standard.270 
Marijuana businesses are still in their nascence in the United States.  Due 
to the challenges described here and elsewhere,271 marijuana business owners 
may avoid organizing their businesses using a legal entity altogether.  This 
would cost them access to limited liability and the advantages of entity 
personhood but may save them from fiduciary liability.  One of the few large, 
incorporated, publicly traded marijuana businesses is MedMen Enterprises, 
Inc.272  MedMen trades on the Canadian Stock Exchange because the legal 




 266. Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Industry’s Challenge for Business 
Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511, 522 (2015) (relying on Nancy Benac & 
Alicia Caldwell, Marijuana Legalization Gains Support, Confounding Policymakers, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/29/narij 
uana-legalization n 3521547.html [perma.cc/NGE7-25VK]). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 526–27. 
 269. Marijuana businesses (and the businesses that do business with them) face 
other hurdles in utilizing U.S. business law infrastructure. See, e.g., Clifford J. White 
III & John Sheahan, Why Marijuana Assets May Not Be Administered in Bankruptcy, 
36 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2017) (“[T]he bankruptcy system may not be used as 
an instrument in the ongoing commission of a crime, and reorganization plans that 
permit or require continued illegal activity may not be confirmed.”); Arthur Linton 
Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS vol. 6A § 1373 (West 1962) (“A bargain may be 
illegal because the performance that is bargained for is illegal; and the performance 
may be illegal because governmental authority has declared it to be a ‘crime.’”). 
 270. See supra Part II.B. 
 271. See generally Scheuer, supra note 266.  
 272. James F. Peltz, Fast Growing Pot Seller MedMen Faces Lawsuit by Former 
Insider, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
cannabis-medmen-lawsuit-20190224-story.html [perma.cc/5962-T64N]. 
 273. Stephen Rodrick, Rise of Big Weed: MedMen’s Growing Pains, ROLLING 
STONE (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
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subsidiaries (a Delaware LLC and a California corporation), but MedMen 
itself is incorporated in Canada.274  There are currently two lawsuits pending: 
one against the founders alleging breach of fiduciary duty, the other against 
the company alleging a variety of misconduct.275  These suits do not include 
per se claims, but they highlight that marijuana businesses are already 
involved in breach of fiduciary suits.  The cost to the plaintiff of tacking on a 
per se claim – thus increasing the risk of and potential magnitude of liability 
for the directors – is relatively low. 
C.  Google and Board Imprimatur for Sexual Harassment 
The Me Too movement is resulting in more than just embarrassment for 
companies: it is creating legal risk for directors.276  The usual view might be 
that any board fiduciary liability for sexual harassment by company 
employees would be limited to Caremark claims.277  But rather than pursue 
“possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff 
might hope to win a judgment,”278 the complaint in a recent derivative suit 
against board members of Google’s parent company states outright, “This is 
not a ‘failure to supervise’ case.”279  
Rather, the complaint alleges that the board “was directly involved in 
and approved” the relevant severance payments.280  It “violated California and 




 274. Complaint at ¶ 3, Parker v. MM Enterprises USA, LLC, No. 19-smcvV-
00189 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 2019). 
 275. James Peltz, Fast-Growing Pot Seller MedMen Faces Lawsuit by Former 
Insider, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
cannabis-medmen-lawsuit-20190224-story.html [perma.cc/36HT-NPMJ]; Complaint 
at ¶ 2, MMMG-MC, Inc. v. Bierman, No. 19-smcv-00045, (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2019); 
Complaint, Parker v. MM Enterprises USA, LLC, No. 19-smcv-00189 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 
Jan. 29, 2019). 
 276. See generally Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and 
Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1612–66 (2018) (surveying a number of 
post-Me Too derivative lawsuits and noting that claims may fall under Caremark or a 
per se standard, although the latter “is perhaps the doctrinal category in which the 
doctrinal case for liability is the weakest”). 
 277. Id. at 1630–41.  
 278. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 279. Complaint at ¶ 12, Martin v. Page, No. 19-civ-00164 (Sup. Ct. Cali. Jan. 10, 
2019) (emphasis removed). 
 280. Id. 
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continue.”281  Because the board did not meet its obligation to conduct 
Google’s affairs “in compliance with all applicable laws, rules, and 
regulations,”282 the board’s actions were bad faith and “f[e]ll outside the scope 
of the business judgment rule.”283  The complaint points not just to direct harm 
to Google caused by the alleged unlawful conduct but also to indirect harm 
such as a recent coordinated employee walkout across Google offices.284 
The allegations against Google directors might seem thin.  The 
unredacted portions of the complaint are not clear as to what exactly was the 
underlying unlawful conduct, and it is by no means certain that reacting to 
unlawful conduct by terminating the offending party – even with a hefty 
severance – qualifies as failing to stop known violations of the law under In 
re Abbott.285  But the yawning chasm between the standards for a per se claim 
and a Caremark claim makes the complaint’s characterization as “not a failure 
to supervise case” dangerous to Google.  
Another example from the Me Too movement where the per se standard 
might apply is with Harvey Weinstein and the Weinstein Company.  Did the 
board fail to meet its duty to monitor by approving an employment agreement 
for Harvey Weinstein that effectively allowed him to buy his way out of 
sexual assault and harassment scandals with a liquidated damages 
provision?286  Weinstein’s 2015 employment contract provided that if he 
“treated someone improperly in violation of the company’s Code of Conduct,” 
he would be required to reimburse the company for settlements and judgments 
and to “pay the company liquidated damages of $250,000 for the first such 
instance, $500,000 for the second such instance, $750,000 for the third such 
instance, and $1,000,000 for each additional instance.”287   
Bainbridge has argued that a board presented with red flags has a duty 
to investigate under Caremark,288 and the Weinstein Company board surely 
 
 281. Id. ¶ 43. 
 282. Id. ¶ 56. 
 283. Id. ¶ 14. 
 284. Id. ¶ 152–56. 
 285. See supra Part II. 
 286. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 276, at 1643–44 (discussing the possibility of 
a fiduciary suit against the Weinstein Company based on a failure to monitor). 
 287. Harvey Weinstein’s Contract with TWC Allowed for Sexual Harassment, 
TMZ (Oct. 12, 2017 2:57 PM), http://www.tmz.com/2017/10/12/weinstein-contract-
the-weinstein-company-sexual-harassment-firing-illegal/ [perma.cc/99M5-9E8A] 
(quoting Weinstein’s employment contract). 
 288. Stephen M. Bainbridge, CEO Private Lives in the Present Dystopia, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 9, 2018), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/pr 
ofessorbainbridgecom/2018/05/ceo-private-lives-in-the-present-dystopia.html 
[perma.cc/R4BV-RJSG] (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise 
Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967 (2009)). 
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was presented with red flags, given the content of his employment 
agreement.289  Moreover, the board’s actions may fall under the stricter 
standard from In re Abbott rather than Caremark.  The directors certainly 
“knew of the violations of law,” and the company surely suffered “substantial 
. . . losses.”290  But the board did take steps to “prevent or remedy the 
situation.”291  The decision to attempt to prevent illegal behavior through 
financial disincentives rather than either firing Weinstein outright or firing 
him when he treated someone else improperly might be ethically dubious and 
it may have been bad business judgment, but it would seem to be just the sort 
of business judgment the business judgment rule is designed to protect.  A per 
se standard threatens to treat that decision much more harshly. 
D.  Dick’s Sporting Goods and Walmart Violate Civil Rights Laws by 
Refusing to Sell Guns 
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, Dick’s Sporting Goods and 
Walmart recently announced that they would cease all firearms sales to 
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.292  Unfortunately for those companies, several 
states have enacted civil rights laws barring age discrimination in places of 
public accommodation such as retailers.293  The change in policy has 
significant business implications.294  But the change in policy at Dick’s, at 
 
 289. Cf. Ted Johnson, Weinstein Scandal Triggers Questions of Corporate 
Liability and Even Complicity, VARIETY (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/harvey-weinstein-sexual-harassment-corporate-
liability-21st-century-fox-1202598683/ [perma.cc/YL6K-87KM] (quoting prominent 
Delaware lawyer Franci G.X. Pileggi for the proposition that “If it is correct that the 
board knew about this propensity and the future likelihood of an occurrence, then the 
question would be whether the board was fulfilling its fiduciary duty”). 
 290. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Julie Creswell and Michael Corkery, Walmart and Dick’s Raise Minimum 
Age for Gun Buyers to 21, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/walmart-and-dicks-major-gun-
retailers-will-tighten-rules-on-guns-they-sell.html [perma.cc/2YQZ-FYE5].  Dick’s 
and Walmart are already barred by federal law from selling handguns to 18- to 20-
year-olds, so the new policy only applies to long guns such as rifles and shotguns. 
 293. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2302(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 
659A.409 (2019). 
 294. Dick’s change in policy was spurred in part by learning that the Parkland 
shooter bought some of his guns at a Dick’s location.  The possibility of selling guns 
to a mass shooter creates litigation risk.  See, e.g., Texas Judge Lets Church Shooting 
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least, appears to have been driven in significant part by Dick’s CEO Edward 
Stack’s view that “we have a problem with gun laws in this country” and that 
the change “was about our values and standing up for what we think is right” 
even if it “would have a negative effect on [Dick’s] business” because the 
“issue transcends [Dick’s] bottom line.”295  The Monday after the Parkland 
shooting, Stack told Lee Belitsky, Dick’s CFO, “I don’t really care what the 
financial implication is.”296  Dick’s policy change, then, is the sort of 
lawbreaking Pollman categorizes as a moral stance.297  The financial 
implication itself is hard to pinpoint, but sales and net income are down.298  
According to Stack, he expected the change in policy to cost Dick’s “[a] 
quarter of a billion dollars” and the company did lose close to that.299  Stack 
pointed to both public backlash against its policy change and to competition 
from Amazon as drivers in the declines.300  Dick’s stock price dropped in 
response to its announcement of declining sales and net income, but its stock 
price still rose ten percent between February 2018 and March 2019.301   
Because the board expressly approved Stack’s proposal,302 it also would 
fall afoul of a per se rule.  Indeed, Dick’s and Walmart have already been sued 
 
lets-church-shooting-victims-sue-gun-retailer [perma.cc/XAR6-B48X] (reporting on 
a judicial ruling that will allow a lawsuit to move forward against Academy Sport & 
Outdoors for selling a gun to the 2017 Sutherland Spring shooter). 
 295. Edward W. Stack, Opinion, I Run Dick’s Sporting Goods. It’s Congress’s 




 296. Sarah Nassauer, How Dick’s Sporting Goods Decided to Change Its Gun 
Policy, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-
dicks-sporting-goods-decided-to-change-its-gun-policy-1543955262 
[perma.cc/5A7J-PKN9]. 
 297. Pollman, supra note 8, at 742.  
 298. Tiffany Hsu, Dick’s Sporting Goods Shifts From Guns Even as Sales Suffer, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/business/dicks-
sporting-goods-stock-gun-control.html [perma.cc/G8AJ-6J3G]. 
 299. Michelle Kessel, Corporations and Guns: How Companies Are Reshaping 
the Gun Control Debate, CBS NEWS (Oct. 6, 2019, 9:31AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/corporations-and-guns-how-companies-are-
reshaping-the-gun-control-debate/ [perma.cc/5SS7-XQU9]. 
 300. Tiffany Hsu, Dick’s Sporting Goods Shifts From Guns Even as Sales Suffer, 
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/business/dicks-sporting-goods-
stock-gun-control.html [perma.cc/HL5Z-GXAS]. 
 (Mar. 12, 2019). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Nassauer, supra note 296.  
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in Oregon and Michigan under those states’ respective civil rights laws.303  
Dick’s settled the Oregon suit but has not changed its policy.304  The Oregon 
Bureau of Labor & Industries “issued a memo . . . suggesting that it is illegal 
for retailers to restrict gun and ammunition sales based on the buyers [sic] 
age” after a complaint was filed by an eighteen-year-old when a Walmart store 
refused to sell her a rifle or ammunition.305 
V.  APPLYING THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
Both observance and disregard of the law have a long tradition in moral 
argument.  Martin Luther King, Jr. pointed to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas 
in dividing laws into just and unjust.306  Unjust laws are defined by their lack 
of “harmony with the moral law.”307  Relying on Aquinas, King pointed to 
eternal law and natural law as the source of moral law.308  Just laws carry “not 
only a legal but a moral responsibility” of obedience.309  But “one has a moral 
responsibility to disobey unjust laws.”310  King did not seem to provide for 
any middle ground where a director can exercise discretion.  But King was 
 
 303. Complaint, Watson v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 18-cv-07671 (Cir. 
Ct. Ore. March 5, 2018); Complaint, Watson v. Walmart, Inc., No. 18-cv-07628 (Cir. 
Ct. Ore. March 5, 2018); Complaint, Fulton v. Dick’s Sporting Goods (Cir. Ct. Mich. 
Mar. 6, 2018); Nick Morgan, Injunction Denied in Under-21 Gun Suit, MAIL TRIBUTE 
(Apr. 13, 2018), http://mailtribune.com/news/crime-courts-emergencies/injunction-
denied-in-under-21-gun-suit [perma.cc/UV8Z-3WE9]; see also Jazz Shaw, Oregon 
Looks to End Walmart’s Policy Against Rifle Sales To 18 To 20 Year Olds, HOT AIR 
(Sept. 4, 2018, 6:41PM), https://hotair.com/archives/2018/09/04/oregon-looks-end-
walmarts-policy-rifle-sales-18-20-year-olds/ [perma.cc/QGB4-P883] (reporting on 
the Watson suit and another lawsuit against Walmart on the same basis); Nick Morgan, 
supra note 53 (reporting on similar suits against two other retailers). 
 304. Jonathan Levinson, Dick’s Sporting Goods Settles Lawsuit Over Gun Sale 
Age Restrictions, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Dec. 4, 2018 5:06 PM), 
https://www.opb.org/news/article/dicks-sporting-goods-settles-lawsuit-gun-sale-age-
restrictions/ [perma.cc/6HYY-FH8H]. 
 305. Ted Sickinger, Oregon retailers can’t bar gun sales based on age, BOLI 
suggests, THE OREGONIAN, (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/ind 
ex.ssf/2018/08/oregon_retailers_cant_bar_gun.html [perma.cc/WZ34-FWL4]; but 
see Nick Morgan, supra note 303 (quoting lawyers for Dick’s as arguing that “The 
letter does not state that the refusal to sell firearms to those under 21 is illegal, and it 
expresses no opinion on the merits of any potential claim”). 
 306. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
(Aug. 1963). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. (emphasis added). 
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also making an argument about when one should violate the law, not about 
liability for doing so.  Indeed, King believed that civil disobedience must be 
done “with a willingness to accept the penalty.”311  King’s arguments tell us 
very little about what the appropriate standard of liability should be for 
directors for breach of fiduciary duty. 
Others have taken for granted that economic activity should not violate 
the law.  Adam Smith said that “[e]very man, as long as he does not violate 
the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own 
way.”312  Milton Freidman famously said that in a free economy, “there is one 
and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage 
in activities designed to increase its profits . . . .”313  The next part of that 
sentence, though, is “so long as it stays within the rules of the game.”314  This 
might seem to embrace Strine’s view of the law, but Friedman defined the 
“rules of the game” as “engag[ing] in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud.”315  It is possible to violate any number of laws and 
regulations while openly and freely competing in the marketplace, without 
deception or fraud,316 just as Smith’s “laws of justice” do not necessarily 
extend to all laws.317 
Complicating matters is the extreme growth in laws malum prohibitum 
relative to laws malum in se.318  To put it another way, behavior is increasingly 
prohibited by law because it is against the law, not because it is morally 
wrong.  A definition of good faith that extends to violations of laws malum 
prohibitum would then significantly restrict the discretion of directors 
operating in a highly regulated economy where criminal law is increasingly 
used as a tool to regulate corporate conduct.319  Beveridge claims that there 
are no corporations in compliance with the law, only corporations “out of 
 
 311. Id. 
 312. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 687 (LONDON, W. STRAHAN & T. 
CADELL 1776) (emphasis added). 
 313. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 112 (U. Chi. Press 1962). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. But see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase 
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (arguing that “the basic rules of 
society” include “both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom,” 
implying that what a businessperson may not do in the pursuit of profit is larger than 
the law, not smaller). 
 317. SMITH, supra note 312, at 687. 
 318. Crimes that are malum prohibitum “are acts that are criminal merely because 
they are prohibited by statute, not because they violate natural law.” Bainbridge, 
Convergence, supra note 11, at 592. 
 319. Id. at 594. 
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compliance with the law to varying degrees.”320  Given the proliferation of 
law and regulations, any and all violations of law simply cannot fairly be 
characterized as “a dishonest, pretextual use of power for noncorporate 
purposes.”321 
Complicating our inquiry is that we are not asking whether illegal 
conduct should lead to liability.  We are asking whether illegal conduct should 
lead to liability by the directors for breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation 
(and, indirectly, its shareholders).  One way to analytically tie the former to 
the latter is by arguing that shareholders lack the authority to direct the 
corporation to violate the law.322  Strine expresses incredulity that “an act of 
intentional misconduct that injures the corporation could be loyal.”323  If 
shareholders lack the authority to direct the corporation to violate the law, 
then violating the law is disloyal because the shareholders necessarily have 
not authorized it.  But the moral authority to direct an action by the 
corporation324 is not the same as the actual authority to do so.  A controlling 
shareholder who directs the corporation to violate the law would not then be 
able to disclaim liability on the basis that they lacked the authority to do so. 
Strine’s approach could also create significant liability – if only in the 
form of attorneys’ fees – even where there is no injury to the corporation.  The 
question is how strict a standard should apply.  Standards in Delaware in the 
corporate governance context range from the very lenient business judgment 
rule to the much stricter per se standard that Strine seems to advocate.325  The 
stark difference in standards for conduct that may be functionally and morally 
equivalent, but-for falling afoul of one of thousands upon thousands of 
picayune laws and regulations,326 adds just the sort of confusion that the 
 
 320. Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director Have a Duty Always to 
Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 732 (1996). 
 321. Strine, supra note 7, at 655. 
 322. Cf. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade?, supra note 138, at 591 (“The sole 
proprietor is generally free to maximize the profitability of his or her business 
operations; however, he or she cannot do so in a way that violates the spirit of high 
moral content regulation.  If the proprietor becomes a passive shareholder and hires 
the CEO to manage the firm, the proprietor has no moral authority to authorize the 
CEO to do anything that the proprietor could not ethically do.”); see also PRINCIPLES 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(1) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1994) (“[T]he corporation, in the conduct of its business is obliged, to the 
same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law.”). 
 323. But see Strine, supra 6, at 660. 
 324. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade?, supra note 138, at 591. 
 325. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the 
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1156–57 (1990). 
 326. The makers of Country Time Lemonade covered legal fines for children 
operating unlicensed lemonade stands. Jason Kottke, Country Time Will Cover Illegal 
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Delaware legislature and courts seek to mitigate.327  Stone v. Ritter provided 
doctrinal clarity;328 making violations of law per se acts of bad faith would 
remove much of that clarity.  Adding a requirement that the violation be 
“knowing” would reduce liability but would reduce certainty as well.329  
One answer is to use violations of law as a burden shifting trigger rather 
than as a basis for liability.  For example, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
in Technicolor that, if the burden of proof for a breach of duty of care claim 
was met, then the burden shifted to the directors, who now had the burden of 
showing that they caused no harm (entire fairness) rather than the plaintiffs 
having the burden of showing damages.330  This approach would allow 
directors to escape liability where the corporation was not harmed (albeit not 
where they incorrectly believed that the corporation would not be harmed).331  
To consider the appropriate rule, we now return to our five models of political 
theory. 
A.  Communitarian Models 
In some ways, a per se standard for violations of positive law is more 
easily reconciled with a non-liberal model than with a liberal model.  To say 
that violating the law violates the duty of loyalty raises the question: loyalty 
to whom?  The traditional formulation of fiduciary duty was that the loyalty 
of the director to the corporation must be “undivided and unselfish.”332  Under 
a per se standard, the loyalty of the director is no longer undivided.  The 
adherent of populist communitarianism would be pleased to see the director 
ordered to show an element of loyalty to the state and its elected 
representatives.  The adherent of CST may have more mixed feelings. 
 
Lemonade Stand Fines and Fees This Summer, KOTTKE.ORG (June 12, 2018), 
https://kottke.org/18/06/country-time-will-cover-illegal-lemonade-stand-fines-and-
fees-this-summer [perma.cc/7FVC-TY2P]; see also Daniel T. Ostas, Civil 
Disobedience in a Business Context: Examining the Social Obligation to Obey Inane 
Laws, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 291, 302 (2010) (noting that some business regulations “have 
no moral justification whatsoever.”). 
 327. Cf. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the 
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990) (stating that the Van Gorkom 
decision “exemplifies the legal uncertainty that contributed to the insurance crisis”). 
 328. Strine, supra note 6, at 695. 
 329. See id.  
 330. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 370–71 (Del. 1993) 
 331. Id. at 371.  
 332. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939), superseded by statute, DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001); see also Pace, supra note 19, at 711–13 (giving 
examples of courts using morally inflected language to talk about fiduciary duties). 
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1.  Populist Communitarianism 
Both the democratic communitarian and the populist communitarian 
would support a per se rule on the basis that it allows “justice to be defined 
by the . . . political preferences of those who . . . have been vested with the a 
priori power to define justice.”333  The populist communitarian might disagree 
with the democratic communitarian on, for example, the appropriateness of 
the Apple CEO publishing an open letter criticizing a court order that it 
decrypt an iPhone used by a terrorist.334  The democratic communitarian 
might see the letter as an individual with special knowledge contributing to 
the public debate and engaging with the democratic process on an important 
issue.  The populist communitarian might see the criticism of the court as a 
threat to public order and stability coming from an elite who does not want to 
play by the same rules as everyone else. 
Taking my tweaks to democratic communitarianism into account, the 
populist communitarian would be more favorable to a per se rule.  A per se 
rule emphasizes the importance of community norms expressed through 
positive law, presumably including local ordinances.  A small, local, 
privately-held business may fit the definition of a “smaller communal entity,” 
while a large, national, publicly-held corporation does not.335  The populist 
communitarian would for that reason prefer the ability to impose community 
norms through local ordinances.  A per se rule has embedded within it a strong 
presumption in favor of law and stability.  A per se rule “acknowledges 
societal interests in the rule of law.”336  The populist communitarian would be 
leery of the sort of “disobedience with the potential for innovation or change” 
that Pollman discusses.337  A per se rule also shackles large corporations and 
their elite managers and directors.  This would be particularly attractive to a 
populist communitarian who decries elites who do not have to play by the 
same rules as the rest of society.  An approach that insulated directors from 
liability for violations of positive law through the business judgment rule 
would appear as just that to the populist communitarian. 
 
 333. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 774 (emphasis added).  
 334. See Pollman, supra note 8, at 737–39 (discussing the situation and quoting 
the open letter). 
 335. See id. at 763 (“[Public corporations] are not associational in terms of fitting 
a paradigm of a voluntary association or community in which individuals feel a sense 
of connection.” (citing Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 639, 672–73) (2016))). 
 336. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VANDERBILT 
L. REV. 101, 105 (2019). 
 337. Id. at 731–48. 
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2.  Catholic Social Thought 
Things are more complicated viewed through the perspective of CST.  
More than any other theory discussed in this Article, CST is concerned with 
moral questions that go beyond positive law.  CST sets a clear hierarchy when 
it comes to natural and positive law: a positive law that violates natural law 
must yield to natural law.338  This raises the obvious question: who is 
competent to judge positive law against natural law, if not legislatures?  
Judges?  Individuals?  Shareholders, either individually or collectively? 
In a pluralistic society where the state plays a significant role, laws and 
regulations will inevitably conflict with an individual’s deeply held principles.  
But a corporation might “act as a vital counterweight against the state – an 
alternative island of power within society.”339  A per se rule substitutes “some 
judge’s or some bureaucrat’s definition of honor” for individuals’ own 
definition of “what constitutes trustworthy or honorable behavior.”340  Rather 
than making people virtuous, a per se rule displaces personal virtue.341   
Allowing federal, or even foreign, law342 to hijack state fiduciary 
obligation law would also seem to violate the principle of subsidiarity.343  The 
old approach, requiring that corporations receive a charter from the state,344 is 
antithetical to subsidiarity.  Charters on demand allow for an essential, organic 
formation of corporations, which is more in keeping with the principle of 
subsidiarity.345  Corporations are creatures in the state in that they rely on a 
state-issued charter to receive the benefits of the corporate form (most notably, 
limited liability).346  But to give that any real teeth – say by including a 
condition that the corporation follow the law, on pain of fiduciary liability for 
its directors – moves corporations back to the traditional approach.  It violates 
subsidiarity because it does something at the level of a state that can be done 
at a lower level – the corporate level itself.  It should go without saying that 
the charter-on-demand corporation has been vastly more successful than the 
 
 338. See, e.g., Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., Catholic Social Teaching and 
American Legal Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 277, 282 (2002). 
 339. Bainbridge, CST, supra note 174, at 598. 
 340. Id. at 600. 
 341. Id. (appealing to the authority of Michael Novak, Russell Kirk, and 
Christopher Lasch). 
 342. See supra Part II. 
 343. See supra Part III.C. 
 344. Cf. Clarke & Lyons, supra note 199, at 289 (“Originally, corporations were 
viewed as quasi-public entities.”). 
 345. See supra Part III.C.  
 346. See supra Part III.C.2.  
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state-issued-charter corporation.  Conversely, the corporation may be able to 
accomplish just acts that could not be accomplished by individuals.347 
CST distinguishes between just and unjust laws.348  It is lawful to resist 
abuses of authority if that resistance is within “the limits imposed by natural 
law and the gospel.”349  Under CST, the board can350 – and, indeed, should – 
disobey unjust laws.  But conversely, the board must obey just laws.351  A 
board is not justified, for example, in violating hours and wages laws352 or 
environmental protection laws. 
A per se rule, then, is clearly too inflexible.  Bainbridge argues that “the 
Church properly is concerned less with rigid codes of conduct than with 
promoting sound context-based judgment.”353  Directors must have some 
leeway for matters of conscience.354  A per se rule is justifiable for violations 
of law malum in se – in fact, it is preferable – but violations of law malum 
prohibitum should be shielded by the business judgment rule, or, if part of an 
interested transaction, be subject to the entire fairness standard and the normal 
rules for voiding and cleansing.  Even that is not as straightforward as it might 
seem because there is no clear line between violations of law malum in se and 
malum prohibitum.355  A violation of a requirement that employee health 
insurance plans cover contraception (or a violation of civil rights laws that 
demand retailers not refuse to sell long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds) 
 
 347. Clarke & Lyons, supra note 199, at 297–98.  
 348. Supra Part III.C.2. 
 349. POPE PAUL VI, Gaudium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 4. 
 350. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 51 (“[I]f civil 
authorities pass laws or command anything opposed to the moral order . . . neither the 
laws made nor the authorizations granted can be binding on the consciences of the 
citizens.”); id. at ¶ 46 (“[I]f any government does not acknowledge the rights of man 
or violates them, it not only fails in its duty, but its orders completely lack juridical 
force.”). 
 351. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Gaudium et Spes, supra note 172, at ¶ 74 (stating 
that when political authority is “exercised within the limits of morality and on behalf 
of the dynamically conceived common good, according to a juridical order enjoying 
legal status . . . citizens are conscience-bound to obey”). 
 352. See, e.g., POPE PAUL VI, Pacem in Terris, supra note 172, at ¶ 20 (“[T]he 
worker has a right to a wage determined according to criterions of justice.”).  
 353. Bainbridge, CST, supra note 174, at 6. 
 354. Cf. Clarke & Lyons, supra note 199, at 289 (arguing that the proper 
framework for analyzing actions that may not maximize economic return to 
shareholder is not “fairness to individual shareholders” but rather “a matter of 
justice”); but see King, supra note 306 (arguing that civil disobedience requires 
accepting liability). 
 355. See, e.g., Kinney v. State, 927 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (“The 
distinction between crimes that are ‘mala prohibita’ and those that are ‘mala in se’ has 
not only shaped but, to a certain extent, also bedeviled the law.”). 
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might be both considered malum in se and just the sort of action morally 
required.356 
B. Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism requires weighing the estimated benefits of a rule against 
the estimated costs.357  One of the costs of any rule that increases the 
likelihood that directors will face liability for breach of fiduciary duty is that 
it discourages high-quality candidates from taking board positions.358  The 
economically-minded utilitarian is also concerned with agency costs.359  A 
board directing the corporation to violate the law, especially in regard to a 
product as politically charged as firearms (in the Dick’s and Walmart 
example), may be acting in furtherance of the directors’ personal beliefs rather 
than the best interest of the corporation.  But that agency cost must be weighed 
against the agency cost of giving monitoring power to shareholders (by 
opening the possibility of suit under a per se standard) and against any other 
costs associated with a per se rule.360 
The per se approach removes some of the control granted to the board 
over the corporation and gives it to individual shareholders, not to the 
shareholders as a whole.  This effectively gives more power to dissident 
shareholders.361  Delaware corporation law gives the lion’s share of control 
over the corporation not to the shareholders but to the board of directors.362  
Shareholders, like judges, “necessarily have less information about the needs 
of a particular firm than do that firm’s directors.”363  A permissive rule allows 
 
 356. Cf. Pollman, supra note 8, at 744–45 (discussing Hobby Lobby’s challenge 
to the Affordable Care Act); see also Ostas, Civil Disobedience, supra note 326, at 
299–301 (categorizing prohibitions on hiring undocumented workers as arguably 
unjust). 
 357. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 770.  
 358. Strine, supra note 6, at 687 (noting that Caremark recognized just such a 
risk). 
 359. Øyvind Bøhren, The Agent’s Ethics in the Principal-Agent Model, 17 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 745, 750 (1998). 
 360. See id. at 749 (showing agency costs in giving shareholders significant 
powers are high).   
 361. Why expect that dissident shareholders will be an issue?  Because they 
already are in the context of shareholder proposals. Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta 
Giannetti, The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy 1 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 586/2018, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p 
apers.cfm?abstract_id=3269378. 
 362. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 559 (“Delaware case 
law consistently indicates a regime of director primacy.” (citations omitted)). 
 363. Id. at 570 (speaking only vis-à-vis judges). 
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directors to be judged not by judges but by presumably more efficient 
“Darwinian” market forces.364  That is, shareholders who disapprove of the 
board’s actions can vote with their dollars and their feet by selling their 
shares.365  That, in turn, pressures directors to avoid such a response.366  The 
utilitarian might also point out that shareholders are poorly suited to 
monitoring corporate lawbreaking.367 
A per se rule is more attractive from a utilitarian perspective if the 
various laws that a corporation might violate at the direction of its board are 
systematically under penalized.368  Creating liability for the director may be a 
more efficient alternative to corporate criminal liability.369  This might be 
particularly attractive to the rule-utilitarian.  Arguments for and against a per 
se rule implicate the tension between rule- and act-utilitarianism.370  The more 
complex, and perhaps more interesting, issues arise for the act-utilitarian. 
The act-utilitarian might be inclined to view legal risks and costs as just 
another cost to be weighed against the benefits of an action.  Per Easterbrook 
and Fischel, “Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating 
regulatory laws, when violations are profitable to the firm, because the 
sanctions set by the legislature and courts are a measure of how much firms 
should spend to achieve compliance.”371  But even Easterbook and Fischel 
added that the same obligation may not extend to acts malum in se.372  Legal 
risk should be considered because it is not always clear whether an action 
complies with all laws and regulations.373  The utilitarian might respond to 
 
 364. See id. at 571 (“While market forces work a sort of Darwinian selection on 
corporate decisionmakers, moreover, no such forces constrain judges.” (relying on 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 100 (1991))). 
 365. See e.g., Yuki Noguchi, MCI Vote Symbolic of Merger Disapproval, WASH. 
POST (May 17, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2005/05/17 
/mci-vote-symbolic-of-merger-disapproval/e0a0336c-c898-482a-849a-
07f3285edb26/ [perma.cc/WN9U-WKFD]. 
 366. Id.  
 367. Pollman, supra note 8, at 755–56 (citing DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN 
CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION 63 (2007)). 
 368. Id. at 753–54.  
 369. Id. at 756–57. 
 370. See LEBACQZ, supra note 85, at 17 (briefly introducing the distinction). 
 371. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of 
Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982). 
 372. Id. 
 373. Cf. Sharon Driscoll, Lawyering at the Edge of Innovation: A Conversation 
with Kent Walker, Google’s General Counsel and Senior Vice President, STANFORD 
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critics arguing that “the legislative intent . . . was not to establish a tariff but 
to prohibit certain behavior”374 that the legislature sets the penalties.  If the 
legislature intends to prevent the behavior altogether, it could have set the 
penalties accordingly.   
The utilitarian is also much more likely to recognize that corporate 
lawbreaking can have informational value by identifying outdated laws and 
regulations, conflicting laws, and political and market failures.375  The 
utilitarian will also recognize that corporate lawbreaking may have positive 
as well negative externalities.376  Not only did Uber drive down prices for car 
services, it changed laws that benefited other ride-sharing companies.377  
Kellogg’s intransigence regarding cereal labelling rules resulted in regulatory 
changes that allowed food companies to better give consumers “information 
about food products.”378  Lawbreaking can be an effective strategy to build 
grassroots political support for ending rent-seeking through regulation, as in 
the case of Uber.379 
The utilitarian will likely recognize that the change in policy by Dick’s 
and Walmart will have no effect on the market for guns.  It affects only a very 
small portion of the market (only the market for long guns and only purchases 
by eighteen- to twenty-year-olds).380  And that market will continue to be 
 
counsel-and-senior-vice-president/ [perma.cc/Z7AP-2ZYF] (“We do the best we can 
to make sure we’re complying with all present and future rules out there, and we’ve 
usually gotten it right.”) (emphasis added). 
 374. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on 
Steering Between Schylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.789, 794 n.11 
(1984). 
 375. Pollman, supra note 8, at 731; Tim Wu, Strategic Law Avoidance Using the 
Internet: A Short History, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 7, 17 (2017)). 
 376. See Pollman, supra note 8, at 731–32 (“[T]he benefits that might flow from 
corporate disobedience aimed at clarifying or changing the law may accrue to others 
where the company pushes for broad legal change beyond an individual regulatory 
exemption or waiver.”). 
 377. Id. at 734–35 (citing Jack Stewart, As Uber Crumbles, Lyft Builds Its Future, 
WIRED (June 14, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/uber-lyft-crisis/ 
[perma.cc/66M9-PPNG]); Ben Thompson, Intel, MobilEye, and Smiling Curves, 
STRATECHERY (Mar. 14, 2017), https://stratechery.com/2017/intel-mobileye-and-
smiling-curves/ [perma.cc/A4LW-TDLF]; see also Rogers, supra note 262, at 90–91 
(listing positive externalities from Uber). 
 378. See Pollman, supra note 8, at 747.  
 379. Supra Part IV. 
 380. Lauren Thomas, Walmart Plans to Dramatically Step Back From 
Ammunition Sales After ‘Horrific’ Shootings, CNBC (Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/03/walmart-plans-to-dramatically-step-back-from-
gun-sales-after-horrific-shootings.html [perma.cc/W7FR-6X3S].   
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served by any number of sellers.381  So the cost to eighteen- to twenty-year-
olds who want to purchase long guns is negligible, while Dick’s and Walmart 
employees are left happier because they are no longer engaging in a 
transaction they find immoral.  Net happiness increases.  The problem with 
this simple calculus, though, is that neither employees nor shareholders were 
polled.382  Many likely take no moral issue with selling long guns to eighteen- 
to twenty-year-olds (it didn’t stop them from working there or buying stock 
in those companies prior to the policy change, for example), and others likely 
find it immoral to refuse to do so. 
Act-utilitarianism, at least, counsels against adopting a per se rule for 
liability for violations of positive law.383  Absent clear statutory direction, 
fiduciary obligation should not be used to bootstrap in additional liability 
 
 381. There are more firearm dealers in the United States than McDonald’s 
restaurants. Leanna Garfield, There are 50,000 more gun shops than McDonald’s in 
the US, BUSINESS INSIDER, Oct. 6, 2017, https://www.businessinsider.com/gun-
dealers-stores-mcdonalds-las-vegas-shooting-2017-10 [perma.cc/Z4ZB-D86C] 
(citing BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, Report of Active 
Firearms Licenses – License Type by State Statistics, Sept. 10, 2017, 
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/undefined/ffltypebystate09102017pdf/download 
[perma.cc/PN6K-JK43]).  Excluding Sam’s Club, Walmart operated only 4,177 stores 
in the United States as of December 31, 2013. Krystina Gustafson, Time to Close Wal-
Mart Stores? Analysts Think So (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/31/t 
ime-to-close-wal-mart-stores-analysts-think-so.html [perma.cc/T6GE-6DT9].  Dick’s 
operated just 719 Dick’s Sporting Goods stores, and only 35 Field & Stream stores, 
as of October 28, 2017. Victoria Dean, Dick’s Sporting Goods’ Growth Strategy amid 
Retail Woes (Jan. 9, 2018), https://marketrealist.com/2018/01/dicks-sporting-slowing-
store-expansion?utm_source=yahoo&utm_medium=feed&yptr=yahoo 
[perma.cc/P9DL-ZTS4]; but see Nick Morgan, supra note 303 (reporting on similar 
policies at other large retailers, including “Bi-Mart, REI, and . . . Kroger”). 
 382. Mary Pflum and Andrew Kozak, Walmart Employees Call for Walkout Over 
Gun Sales, NBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2019, 3:22 PM CDT), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/walmart-employees-call-walkout-
over-gun-sales-n1040171 [perma.cc/VRR3-U4PB] (showing that employees 
protested because they were not a part of the discussion in Walmart continuing to sell 
guns in stores); but see Ryan Bort, Taking Guns Off Shelves May Not Be So Bad for 
Business After All, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 23, 2019, 3:20PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/guns-dicks-sporting-goods-
profitable-875761/ [perma.cc/FKJ6-JQPP] (quoting the CEO of Dick’s stating that 
shareholders were happy with the decision since there was rise in stock price after the 
removal of guns from stores). 
 383. See Daniel Hunter, Act Utilitarianism and Dynamic Deliberation, 41 
ERKENNTNIS 1, 30 (1994) (arguing that act-utilitarianist would prefer a “‘summary’ 
view of rules” rather than per se liability). 
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beyond that provided for violation of the positive law itself.384  The utilitarian 
would support a rule that only provides for liability where real harm is shown 
to the corporation and that defers to the business judgment of the directors.   
Optimally, though, the rule should account for both positive and negative 
externalities rather than only harm to the corporation.  The utilitarian view 
might seem to be that there should not be a special rule for violations of law; 
rather, violations of law should be treated the same as any other board act (or 
inaction) that might lead to liability for breach of fiduciary duty.  But 
violations of positive law likely substantially raise the possibility of negative 
externalities.  Given that, a utilitarian may be open to a tougher standard where 
there is a violation of positive law.  The appropriate rule would be a variation 
on the entire fairness standard – the plaintiff must show that act was net 
harmful, considering both benefit and harm to the corporation and positive 
and negative externalities (note the burden has been flipped for prudential 
reasons). 
C.  Liberalism 
1.  Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory 
The appropriateness of a per se rule can be readily dispensed with under 
a Nozickian brand of liberalism.  Violations of law as per se breach of 
fiduciary duty shifts corporate monitoring from the board and the shareholders 
to legislatures, something a Nozickian would view with suspicion from a 
practical standpoint.385  A per se rule gives a right to seek recovery to a party 
– the corporation, presumably acting through a shareholder derivative suit – 
that may not have been injured.386  The per se rule would appear not to require 
a showing of an injury to establish a claim, and breach of fiduciary duty allows 
for claims not directly tied to an injury.387  Under Nozick’s principle of 
compensation, compensation can only be required where an individual’s 
rights are violated.388  To require compensation where they are not would 
violate the rights of the directors.389   
 
 384. Note that this paper is limited to considering the effect of a corporate violation 
of law on the fiduciary duties of the board – the relevant actors (including possibly the 
corporation) would remain culpable for violating the law itself. 
 385. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 14 (“Is there really someone who, searching for a 
group of wise and sensitive persons to regulate him for his own good, would choose 
that group of people who constitute the membership of [a legislature]?”). 
 386. See supra Part II (discussing that per se liability makes corporations’ lawsuits 
easier to bring). 
 387. Id.  
 388. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 151.  
 389. Id. at 153.  
60
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/5
2020] ROGUE CORPORATIONS 61 
 
 
It might be argued that violations of the law infringe on the rights of the 
shareholders because the shareholders have only granted the corporation 
permission to act within the law.  A Nozickian would presumably approve of 
(or even demand) shareholders be allowed to bargain for a charter provision 
providing for per se liability.  It is better to contract for particular paternalistic 
limitations on one’s own behavior than “swallow the exact pattern of 
restrictions a legislature happens to pass.”390  But they cannot be said to have 
voluntarily done so.  The ability of the shareholders to set fiduciary liability 
standards is sharply limited.391 
In Nozick’s view, the state is not entitled to force an individual to 
sacrifice for another individual.392  A per se rule forces sacrifice by the 
directors – and possibly the corporation and thus the shareholder because a 
derivative suit may subtract from, not add to, corporate value – even where 
the director has violated the rights of no other individual (making it a sacrifice, 
not compensation).  Nozick’s vision of a state with legitimacy only to protect 
a narrow set of individual rights would seem to counsel against liability for 
breach of fiduciary duty for violations of laws that go beyond that, but then it 
would counsel against liability for those laws altogether.393  How do we draw 
the line, and why draw it in this scenario (fiduciary duty) and not in others? 
A per se standard also forces the shareholders to sacrifice their right to 
contract for their preferred standard of liability – it is not enough that it might 
be for their own good.394  The appropriate standard, then, should be the one 
that the shareholders consent to (whether explicitly or implicitly, and whether 
within the corporation’s organizational documents).  Only if no separate 
provision is made should a default rule apply; that default rule must only allow 
for liability where the corporation is harmed (negative externalities are 
irrelevant to the Nozickian).395 
 
 390. Id. at 14.  
 391. See supra Part II (discussing how exculpation is limited under Section 
102(b)(7)). 
 392. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 33. 
 393. Id. at 30. 
 394. See Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 788 (“Nozick also noted that ‘the 
state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid 
others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.’”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 395. NOZICK, supra note 71, at 30.  
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2.  John Rawls’ Theory of Justice 
Under a Rawlsian brand of liberalism,396 the question is more difficult 
but the answer the same.  The appropriate standard is difficult to determine 
because Rawls focuses on which rules benefit the least well off, and it is 
difficult to determine ex ante which standard will benefit the poor.397  It isn’t 
as clear as it might seem that a rule making violations of law per se breaches 
of fiduciary duties will benefit the poor.  For one, any damages go to the 
corporation and, indirectly, to its shareholders, a group richer than the average 
American in the aggregate,398 as well as plaintiffs’ attorneys, likewise richer.   
Two, the violation of law itself may help, not hurt, the poor.  Uber may 
take away taxi driving jobs heavily populated by the poor, but it provides 
driving jobs of its own and it pulls down the price of hiring a driver, to the 
benefit of the poor.  Uber may also provide safety benefits.399  Setting aside 
moral concerns about marijuana, state-legal marijuana businesses give the 
poor a low-risk (both in regards to legal risk and risk of violence) vehicle to 
choose to partake in marijuana consumption (although increased use of 
marijuana may hurt the poor especially).400  If you accept that gun violence 
falls hardest on the poor (probable), that Dick’s and Walmart’s policy change 
 
 396. This Article focuses on Rawls’ arguments in A THEORY OF JUSTICE. See supra 
note 94.  It should be noted that Rawls spent considerable effort justifying limits on 
civil disobedience in THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1969), but civil 
disobedience is not quite the question at which this paper is aimed. 
 397. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 766.  
 398. See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, While Trump Touts Stock Market, Many 
Americans Are Left Out of the Conversation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/03/01/517975766/while-trump-touts-stock-market-many-
americans-left-out-of-the-conversation [perma.cc/96KF-9T6N] (“As of 2013, the top 
10 percent of Americans owned an average of $969,000 in stocks. The next 40 percent 
owned $132,000 on average. For the bottom half of families, it was just under 
$54,000.”). 
 399. See Rob Verger, Uber Can Actually Help Prevent Drunk Driving Accidents 
– in Some Cities, POPULAR SCI. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.popsci.com/uber-drunk-
driving [perma.cc/AY72-P6SY] (reviewing the literature on Uber’s effects on motor 
vehicle crashes and noting that some studies have linked the availability of Uber to a 
decline in crashes while some studies have been inconclusive); see also Rogers, supra 
note 262, at 92–94 (arguing that any safety concerns are not a long-term issue because 
they will be self-correcting). 
 400. Solomon Israel, Denver Marijuana Farms Make Unwelcome Neighbours, 
CBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016 5:00AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/denv 
er-marijuana-neighbourhoods-1.3761537; Naomi Schaefer Riley, Legalized Pot is 
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will reduce gun access (dubious), and that it will reduce gun violence 
(unclear), then it is to the poor’s benefit.  Even cheating on overtime and other 
employment laws (e.g., mandatory breaks under California state law) could 
benefit the poor because such laws artificially depress how much the poor are 
able to work and thus how much income they are able to earn.401 
Again, this Article is only concerned with the best possible rule for 
director liability for breach of fiduciary duty for violations of law.  Making a 
violation of law also a breach of fiduciary duty adds an additional layer of 
potential liability.  The relevant actors will always be liable for violating the 
law itself as provided for under the law.  Under Redish’s gloss on Rawlsian 
liberalism,402 that creates an underappreciated problem.  Redish advocates a 
definition of liberalism that is “on most issues of substantive autonomy . . . 
wholly agnostic.”403  That is, the laws of the land control, regardless of the 
extent to which they infringe on substantive autonomy, so long as they do not 
infringe on process-based autonomy. 
But there is a non-obvious process-based autonomy problem with the 
per se approach.  It adds punishment and deterrence beyond that provided for 
by the legislature.  The legislature may or may not have carefully calibrated 
the punishment and deterrence of the law,404 but it is the body provided 
structurally with that authority.  For unelected judges to layer on liability 
beyond that provided for by the elected branches raises concerns under liberal 
theory.  This liability includes, presumably, liability for violations of federal 
law and the laws of other states and nations – liability for laws that the 
Delaware legislature did not pass and has not clearly indicated should provide 
a basis for liability.  Further, the per se approach takes control over seeking 
redress away from the party injured-in-fact and splits it in part between that 
party and the shareholders of the corporation.  And despite the fact that the 
shareholders share claims to the residual earnings of the corporation, the right 
to bring a claim will now be available to any shareholder who wants to sue, 
including gadflies and activists. 
A per se standard may also result in recovery by two parties that may not 
have been injured.  The first is plaintiffs’ attorneys, who may recover even if 
 
 401. Cf. Jon Hartley, FORBES (May 18, 2016, 2:35PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2016/05/18/new-obama-overtime-
regulations-could-harm-tech-startups-and-small-businesses/#368b398d3afc 
[perma.cc/97Z4-JBR4] (criticizing expansion of overtime rules due to the 
distortionary effect of mandated overtime pay). 
 402. Supra Part III.b. 
 403. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 765. 
 404. Cf. Coffee, supra note 374, at 794 n.11 (arguing that “the legislature cannot 
know how high to set penalty levels in order to make the expected penalty cost exceed 
the expected benefit”). 
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the shareholders do not.405  The second is the corporation itself.  Strine’s per 
se formulation does not appear to require a showing of harm.406  Providing for 
recovery by a plaintiff when the defendant has not caused injury to the 
plaintiff is at odds with “corrective justice.”407  Fiduciary obligation law has 
long allowed for recovery even when there is no harm to the entrustor,408 but 
that is based on encouraging loyalty by the agent to the entrustor, not to a 
third party – whether it be the state, society as a whole, or a discrete group 
targeted for protection by the law. 
It is simply incorrect to say that “fiduciary duties constrain officers and 
directors from ‘impos[ing] their personal moral views on the corporation.’”409  
The business judgment rule gives officers and directors enormous discretion 
to do just that so long as the acts they direct the corporation to take comply 
with the law.410  The relevant question is whether the imposition of moral 
views that violate positive law should be treated differently, and dramatically 
so, than the imposition of moral views that do not violate positive law.  For 
the reasons stated above, the imposition of moral views that violate positive 
law should not be treated differently under liberal theory.  As Pollman 
shows,411 individuals “participating in governmental processes and seeking to 
influence the decisions of democratic institutions,” 412 while acting through 
the corporate form, can cause corporate behavior that skirts the law.  Creating 
additional liability for that behavior impinges on “the ability of individuals to 
 
 405. See Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 593 (“The real party in 
interest in derivative litigation is the plaintiff’s attorney, not the nominal shareholder-
plaintiff.  In most cases, the bulk of any monetary benefits go to the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
rather than the corporation or its shareholders.”).  Prior to In re Trulia, Inc. 
Stockholder Litigation, it was common for merger objection lawsuits to end with 
“disclosure-only settlements,” under which only the attorneys recovered. 129 A.3d 
884 (Del. Ch. 2016).  A similar problem arises in the class action context. 
 406. Strine, supra note 6, at 650.  
 407. Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 352 (2007). 
 408. See, e.g., Lum v. McEwen, 57 N.W. 662, 662–63 (Minn. 1894) (“Actual 
injury is not the principle the law proceeds on, in holding such transactions void.  
Fidelity in the agent is what is aimed at . . . .  It is not material that no actual injury to 
the company [principal] resulted.”) 
 409. Pollman, supra note 8, at 762 (quoting Jill Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to 
Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1593, 1603 (2006)). 
 410. Arsht, supra note 13, at 129–30.  
 411. See Pollman, supra note 8, at 742–48 (discussing general business lobbying 
and corporations skirting the law to assert moral stances). 
 412. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 767; but see RAWLS, supra note 94, at 
321 (“[I]t goes without saying that civil disobedience cannot be grounded solely on 
group or self-interest.”). 
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control the nature of their participation in the processes of collective 
democratic government.”413   
A per se rule then cannot be reconciled with the liberalism of either 
Nozick or Rawls.  A liberal theory of fiduciary obligation demands harm to 
the corporation be shown as a predicate for breach of fiduciary duty, even 
where the board directed the corporation to violate positive law.414  Under a 
Rawlsian-Redishian view, it also demands a clear indication by the legislature 
in the state of incorporation that the intent of the law is to co-opt the laws of 
other jurisdictions.  The Delaware legislature has not clearly done so.415  The 
appropriate standard as it stands today, then, is to treat a violation of positive 
law no differently than any other corporate decision.  The business judgment 
rule will apply unless there was an interested transaction.  A tougher standard 
would require the Delaware legislature to act. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It might seem rare that a board will direct the corporation to violate the 
law.  Uber’s regulatory strategy and the decisions by Walmart and Dick’s 
Sporting Goods to not sell long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds may 
appear anomalous.   
They are not anomalous simply because corporations rarely violate the 
law.  Rather, they may be anomalous simply because corporate boards rarely 
direct the corporation to do anything.  The primary function of the board is 
supervisory.416  And virtually all of the decisions asserting that violations of 
law are per se bad faith were written by Chief Justice Strine.  There are 
obvious parallels to the “so-called triad” of good faith, care, and loyalty that 
 
 413. Redish & Berlow, supra note 78, at 765. 
 414. See generally MILL, supra note 90.  
 415. See supra Part II (discussing the lack of clarity in the law in this area).  The 
Rawlsian-Redishian view stands in a certain tension with the Delaware General 
Assembly’s basic approach to corporation law.  Rather than make direct provision for 
entity governance or allow the investors free rein to structure entity governance, as 
with limited liability companies and limited partnerships, Delaware corporation law 
allows the Court of Chancery to retain in significant part its traditional equitable role 
in shaping fiduciary law. See, e.g., In re Oxbow Carbon LLC Unitholder Litig., No. 
12447-VCL, slip op. at 4–27 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2018) (discussing the court’s equitable 
powers at length).  
 416. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 34, at 1494 (noting that boards mostly 
supervise management, “punctuated only occasionally by a discrete transactional 
decision,” rather than take “affirmative action on individual matters”). 
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largely only existed within decisions written by then-Justice Holland,417 but 
Strine is an enormously influential figure in the continuing development of 
Delaware law.  Doctrinal uncertainty may continue due to the “cycling 
phenomenon.”418 
There are practical implications.  Entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
always on the hunt for the next viable theory of liability against corporate 
directors, after all.419  Recent changes in Delaware caselaw that make 
shareholder suits harder to win provide a particular incentive for 
entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers to seek new vehicles for shareholder 
suits.420  A per se standard might prove lucrative – it opens up liability for 
losses normally insulated by the business judgment rule.  If Nike loses market 
share because it made Colin Kaepernick the face of a large marketing 
campaign, shareholders cannot successfully sue because that decision is 
protected by the business judgment rule.421  But if Dick’s Sporting Goods 
 
 417. See Bainbridge, Convergence, supra note 11, at 566 (discussing the near-
exclusive presence of the term in Justice Holland’s opinions and evidence of 
skepticism by other jurists). 
 418. See id. at 566 n.36 (discussing how the Delaware Supreme Court’s unanimity 
norm leads to Delaware corporation law cycling between different doctrinal 
approaches). 
 419. “M&A objection class actions . . . replaced traditional stock drop cases as the 
lawsuit of choice for plaintiff’s attorneys” a decade ago. Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities 
Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 384 (2011).  More recently, the 
“Delaware Chancery court’s 2016 decision in the Trulia case” pushed the percentage 
of M&A deals challenged in federal court from 26 to 96%. Kevin LaCroix, Percentage 
of 2018 Deals Drawing Merger Objection Suits Held Steady, THE D&O DIARY (Sept. 
17, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/09/articles/merger-
litigation/percentage-of-2018-deals-drawing-merger-objection-suits-held-steady/ 
[perma.cc/SZL3-VH2M].  In other circumstances, plaintiffs’ lawyers have been 
likened to the moles in the Whac-a-Mole game – tightening standards for liability in 
one area incentivizes plaintiffs’ lawyers to alter the suits they bring. Howard M. 
Erichson, Cafa’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1607 
(2008). 
 420. Cf. Alison Frankel, Star Shareholders’ Lawyer Stuart Grant is Quitting His 
Practice: ‘I Don’t Like Losing’, REUTERS (June 25, 2018, 12:28PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-grant/star-shareholders-lawyer-stuart-grant-
is-quitting-his-practice-i-dont-like-losing-idUSKBN1JL26J [perma.cc/P7FF-F7BD] 
(reporting on a prominent shareholders’ lawyer leaving his firm to move into the 
litigation finance space because he went from winning “90 to 95 percent of our cases” 
to having “probably lost more than we’ve won,” concluding that “it’s almost 
impossible to challenge a deal in Delaware” and “the courthouse doors are effectively 
closed.”).  
 421. Joshua Fershee, Nike’s Kaepernick Ad Is the Most Business Judgmenty Thing 
Ever, BUS. LAW PROF BLOG (Sept. 13, 2018), 
66
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/5
2020] ROGUE CORPORATIONS 67 
 
 
loses market share because it stops selling long guns to eighteen- to twenty-
year-olds, shareholders presumably can sue and recover based on that market 
share, even though civil liability for violating state bars on age discrimination 
may be negligible. 
There are also practical implications for corporate decision-making.  
One of the goals of corporate governance law is to encourage boards to stay 
informed and monitor management.422  The wide disparity in the plaintiff-
friendly per se standard for a direct violation of law versus the tough standard 
for a failure to monitor compliance offers a perverse incentive for boards to 
avoid reviewing decisions that might violate the law.  Another concern is that 
it allows not just shareholders but dissident shareholders to potentially usurp 
the role of the board.423  Given the availability of equitable relief, a dissident 
shareholder could sue Dick’s or Walmart to force it to reverse its policy 
decision to stop selling long guns to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. 
But the real importance of debating the issue may be the light it sheds on 
more fundamental issues of the role of the corporation, the law, and the 
individual in society.  Starkly different views lead to divergent opinions of 
what the rules that govern society should be.  The five models discussed lead 
to five different approaches.424  But only the populist communitarian model 
lends support to what appears to be the current per se standard.425   
How, then, should we handle divergent results?  Isn’t it true that 
divergent results force us to choose the theory we prize most highly?426  One 
way to handle divergent results is by applying a presumption.427  I offer three 
presumptions.  One, given that only one of five models supports the per se 
standard, there should be a presumption against that standard.  Two, given the 
lack of clarity in the statutory law and caselaw428 and given the divergent 
results reached by applying our five models of political theory,429 there should 
be a presumption against applying a rule that stands in such sharp contrast 
with the rules applied in other, similar situations.  There should be a 




 422. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
 423. Gantchev & Giannetti, supra note 361. 
 424. Supra Part V.A–C. 
 425. Supra Part V.A.1. 
 426. See Barnett, supra note 74, at 165 (noting an objection to his these regarding 
the virtues of redundant methods of analysis). 
 427. See id. at 166 (“We normally handle unyielding conflicts by adopting an 
operative presumption.”). 
 428. Supra Part II. 
 429. Supra Part V. 
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because it is a much harsher rule than applies to conduct covered by the 
business judgment rule or entire fairness.430  Three, given the same two 
conditions noted above, the standard should be set by the legislature, not by 
the courts.  Weighing political theory models necessarily requires value 
judgments of the sort that are rightly the province of representative, elected 
legislatures. 
This perhaps gives the game away by embracing the proceduralism of 
Rawslian-Redishian liberalism, but it is also a communitarian approach (if not 
the exact approach taken by populist communitarianism or CST) because it 
puts the power to set the standard in the hands of a duly-elected legislature.  
The legislature is likely to weigh like against like and set a rule that only 
allows for liability where the corporation itself is harmed.  Simply subsuming 
violations of positive law into the business judgment rule and entire fairness 
is an attractive option.  But the legislature would be justified in a tighter rule 
that recognizes violations of positive law are more likely to lead to harm than 
normal business decisions.  Once the plaintiff has shown a violation of 
positive law, the burden shifts to the defendants to show that there was no 
harm to the corporation.  That is likely to partially satisfy the Nozickian liberal 
(as much as is possible in the non-minimal state)431 and the utilitarian.432 
Dispensing with a per se rule in favor of treating violations of positive 
law like any other board action would not only be efficient but would comport 
with the liberal values that underlie our republic.  It also recognizes that 
fiduciary obligation law is not Superman, crisscrossing the nation in flight 
searching for wrongs to right.  Fiduciary obligation law is calibrated to address 
a very specific set of wrongs and inefficiencies, and it is poorly suited to serve 
as a general purpose cure-all.  To the extent that the underlying violations of 
positive law are underpenalized, the solution is for the appropriate legislature 
 
 430. This is troubling in significant part because it appears to create a stark divide 
in the treatment of similar acts.  It would be less troubling were the Delaware courts 
to embrace a more searching analysis of where the directors were in fact attempting 
to act in the corporation’s best interest, and thus the business judgment rule will 
insulate their conduct, even if their business judgement was in fact terrible, and where 
the directors were not acting in the corporation’s best interest, and thus the business 
judgment rule would not apply at all, because they were not acting in good faith.  This 
extends beyond violations of law.  A tweet by Elon Musk that appeared to taunt the 
SEC might qualify as such. Jonathan Stemple, Tesla’s Musk Mocks SEC as Judge 
Demands They Justify Fraud Settlement, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2018, 1:57PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-musk-sec/teslas-musk-mocks-sec-as-judge-
demands-they-justify-fraud-settlement-idUSKCN1ME2CC [perma.cc/HJX9-6PY4]. 
 431. Cabining how liability for breach of fiduciary duty can be consensually 
tailored will continue to be an issue.  The Delaware legislature might choose to 
continue to loosen those rules, however. 
 432. The insistence that some things are rightfully the province of the legislature 
will continue to stick in the craw of the Posnerians. 
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to recalibrate the underlying law, not to draft fiduciary obligation law to do 
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